Certain historical,
material
and intellectual conditions had to be existent, to enable „co‑operative
socialism“
to come into existence in Guyana. Without these, it would be
impossible.
Without knowing these, we cannot change and improve living conditions
in
Guyana; in fact, without the knowledge of the above, Guyana and
Venezuela
cannot create the historical conditions to solve and resolve their
limitrophe
contradiction. Furthermore, from this scientific point of departure, we
can
identify and determine the political‑qualitative essence of Burnham’s
„socialism“
and Jagan’s „communism“, within the dialectical framework of the
general international
pro‑ and anti‑capitalist forces, tendencies and latencies of our epoch.
For
the time being, it suffices to state that every thing that glitters is
not
necessarily gold; in an analogous manner, every thing is not
anti‑capitalist
that has a „socialist“ or „communist“ appearance form, that uses
extravagant
„Marxist“ verbalism, phraseology and sophistry. The scientific
verification
of historic truth, which will enable true human emancipation, is the
empirical
investigation of concrete socio‑historic reality, in a nut‑shell, of
human
theory‑praxis. 2)
Before embarking on
our
analytic venture, it is necessary to state beforehand that the limits
and
limitations of this brief essay do not permit us to give the necessary
precision
and concise definition to such general concepts and categories as
colonialism,
capitalism, imperialism, socialism, communism and democracy. Because
all
the above terms are enveloped and veiled in an opague smog of
ideological
appearance forms, to avoid misinterpretations and misunderstanding, it
is
necessary that they should be given concise, precise scientific
connotations.
Under the current circumstances, we can only refer to other works of
the
author, which have attempted to radicate and irradicate their
scientific
analytic essence. 3)
On the other hand, within the
scientific spectrum of this analysis, their real meanings logically,
will
reveal themselves. To evade or circumvent their usage would be
scientific
dishonesty, it would debar that what they concretely express in
contemporary
reality.
After this
introductory
warning, let us regress to our topic, to that what has been spotlighted
before.
Certain transhistoric, transnational factors, among them, pro‑ and
anti‑capitalist
forces, have channelled Guianese historic potentiality into a definite
process
towards „co‑operative socialism“. These we will elaborate now.
Throughout
the colonial history of British Guiana, we can witness the
coming‑into‑existence of a major social conflict. It was generated by
the social and „racial“ tensions
and pressures between the haves and the have‑nots, between the wealthy
planters,
farmers, businessmen and traders and the impoverished slaves, helots
and
pariahs of the British colony. 4)
This social contradiction had
produced diverse forms of oppression and resistance; it eventually
epitomised
in a specific irreconcilable antagonism of the 1930s: British
Colonialism
versus Guianese Labour Resistance. The international capitalist crisis
of
the 1930s had produced intense labour unrest, not only in the
metropolitan
countries, but also in their colonies. Originally, the general labour
resistance
in the British colony concentrated itself around the British Guiana
Workers’
League (BGWL, 1931). 5)
Its political pressure was centred
within the social ambit of factory, municipal and government workers.
Although
the Indo‑Guianese majority was mainly employed in the sugar and rice
industries,
the origin of the labour movement had a certain „multi‑racial“ or
„transracial“
imprint. 6)
This historical fact, at the same
time, pinpoints the original genetic essence and anti‑colonial content
of
the labour‑nationalist political process. In spite of the ephemeral
„racist“
appearance forms, the oppressive, exploitative nature of British
colonialism
necessarily had to create its own contradiction within the ranks of the
totality
of subjugated peoples. Subjectively, however, the policies of the
leading
figures, who generally came from various middle class sections,
reflected
a different political world outlook. 7)
Within the next half
decade,
labour revolts spread to the important sugar industry, especially under
the
direction of the Manpower Citizens’ Association (MPCA, 1937). 8)
It was this expansion of the labour
conflict which gave the movement its specific well‑known Indo‑Guianese
impetus;
a trend which will continue until the 1960s. Logically, the British
Government
had to try to neutralise this new challenging Guianese labour
affirmation.
It appointed the Moyne Commission to investigate the „labour
disturbances“,
and to suggest possible social reforms within the general colonialist
status
quo. 9)
In order to remain
within
the general context of historical processes, we should not overlook the
fact
that during that specific period in Guianese history, the world
capitalist
system was movirg inexorably towards one of its major crises, towards
the
Second World War, with all its fascistic, national‑socialistic and
anti‑communistic
implications. The repressive colonial waves of European
capitalism-imperialism
also lashed on the „Sea Wall“ of British Guiana, which was an integral
part
of the global plundering of natural and human resources. Consequently,
the
central capitalist contradiction, although it had its „nodal“ point in
the
„ mother‑countries“, indirectly also affected faraway products, for
example,
the British colonial interests, administered from Georgetown. The
political‑ideological contradiction „facism ‑ democracy“ within
capitalism, certainly, affected the minds of such proliferated leaders
as Dr. Cheddi Jagan and Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham. But it also
penetrated general social consciousness, and therewith, it could
interpenetrate the labour and nationalist movements. However,
such anomalies like the „Hitler‑Stalin Pact“ ‑ a „fascist‑communist“
gentlemen
agreement ‑ and the combined „Allied Forces“ against Nazi Germany ‑ a
unity‑and‑contradiction
of „democratic“ and „communist“ opposites, as synthesis against
„fascism“
‑ sowed confusion and disarray in the international socialist camp.
Ideologically,
these repercussions reverberated in the „Land of Many Flowing Waters“.
This
is an example par excellence of what we meant before by
complex‑multiplex historical processes, which determine each other, and
multiveloce movements, which affect and effect multifarious historical
developments. Within this general post‑war ideological maelstrom,
Jagan’s „communism“ and Burnhams’s
„socialism“ had their historical roots.
During the 1940s, in
British
Guiana itself, the objective‑ and subjective‑real conditions certainly
did
not reflect or produce either „democratic“ or „communist“ realities. In
a
political sense, what were existent, were insidious, volatile
„race‑class“
tensions and contradictions, typical symptom of British colonialist
rule.
These did not favour either an effective trade union unity or a true
conscious
political theory‑praxis. It is common knowledge that ideological
confusion
cannot lead to pragmatic political praxis, and, conversely, that
ineffective
human praxis never can produce real emancipatory theory. This
asymmetric,
dichotomous relation was responsible for the political havoc which
reigned
in the two trade union movements: the Trade Union Council (TUC, 1941)
and
the Guiana Idustrial Workers’ Union (GIWU, 1946). 10)
A sociological analysis of their membership and policies, certainly,
would reveal the germinating „racial“ centrifugal force which hampered
the emancipatory evolution of the labour movement. For our purposes, it
suffices to manifest that the GIWU, like the MPCA, had recruited its
rank and file mainly among the Indo‑Guianese sugar
estate workers; the Afro‑Guianese dominated TUC centred itself in town
and
industrial areas, within the field of operation of the old BGWL. 11)
This did not imply that the
Guianese labour movement, a product of its historic circumstances,
consciously
had taken a „racial“ path.
It is true that, in
1944,
the MPCA had affiliated itself to the TUC, and that the trade unions
under
the umbrella of the TUC had increased to 33 by 1947, but, this
quantitative
change did not generate any qualitative political tendencies. On the
contrary,
the Indo‑Guianese MPCA remained the most influential politico‑economic
force.
We should recollect that this attempted synthesis of Guianese labour
unity
had occurred in the post‑war epoch, at a time, when across the globe
numerous
anti‑colonial national and nationalist „independence“ movements came
into
being. A fervent desire to accomplish „democracy“ and „self
‑government“
was felt across the whole colonial world. Structural changes within the
international
capitalist‑imperialist system ‑
inter alia, the neutralisation of German imperialism and the triumph of
American world „reconstruction“
‑ forced the traditional metropolitan countries to „de‑colonise“ their
most
profitable possessions. In this internatioanal atmosphere of
establishing
„democracy“, safeguarding „peace“ and effecting peaceful
decolonization“,
the material conditions were created to make Guianese anti‑colonial
nationalism
possible. In particular, the evolution and the existence of a labour
movement
and general anti‑colonial resistance in British Guiana was the material
sine
qua non for the genesis of post‑war political nationalism. Of course,
Guianese
nationalism had other historical antecedents, which dated back to the
slave
revolts, to the emancipation of the slaves, and to strikes and protests
of
the workers in the factories and on the rice and sugar fields. 12)
In theoretical coherence with
our methodological approach, and in analytic cohesion with our
dialectical
method, we must emphasise that Guianese labour was moving towards a
political expression, and, conversely, Guianese nationalism was
progressively approximating a working class base. Whether the latter
motion achieved actualisation we
will see below.
In November, 1947, Dr.
Cheddi
Jagan was elected to a seat in the Legislative Assembly of British
Guiana.
13)
The militant leadership of the
GIWU ‑ an organisation which, meanwhile, had surpassed the MPCA twice
in
size - openly supported Jagan’s projected policies. In effect, this
simply
means that it favoured his nationalist drive towards „independence“. At
the
same time, we should keep in mind, that it was no historical
coincidence
that this labour‑nationalist synthesis had a
decisive
Indo‑Guianese momentum. Furthermore, it should be noted, that this
historic
process had very little to do with either „socialism“ or „communism“,
at
least not on Guianese soil. Thus, the social dynamics of the historical
situation
had created a new contradiction: Guianese Nationalism ‑ British
Colonialism.
But, real political workers’ unity remained only a possibility, a
process
in latency‑tendency, not a reality.
Nonetheless, in spite
of
the difficult situation, various trade unionist and political leaders
tried
to form and forge working class unity. This was all the more
complicated
because a real working class movement was then only existing in
embryonic
form. Despite this obstacle, Dr. J. B. Singh founded his British Guiana
Labour
Party (BGLP) and Jagan established his Political Affairs Committee
(PAC).
14)
Within a very short period,
this nationalist‑political drive to counter the disastrous effects of
British
colonial „divide and rule“ and „racism“ evolved into yet another
historical
synthesis. In 1950, the BGLP (now under the direction of Burnham) and
the
PAC (still led by Jagan) amalgamated to form the historic People’s
Progressive
Party (PPP) ‑ the matrix of all contemporary contradictions in Guyana. 15)
This new „unity‑and‑contradiction“
very distinctly revealed the antagonistic tendencies within Guianese
politics,
by unmasking the two real faces of Guianese Nationalism. Ever since,
they
became known as Jagan’s Indo-Guianese „communism“ and Burnham’s
Afro‑Guianese
„socialism“. The concrete, total truth of the matter was that none of
them
was an affirmation of the deepest emancipatory desires of the Guianese
peoples
as a whole, in line with total human emancipation. Thirty years later,
Walter
Rodney’s „Working People’s Alliance (WPA) would demonstrate the true
affirmation
within Guyanese liberation struggle.
What really occurred,
was
that the general political contradiction of the 1950s was reflected in
microcosmos
in the Guianese PPP. Under Stalin’s reign, the real scientific content
and
essence of the October Revolution was putrefied and petrified by a
brutal,
vulgar materialism. 16)
Scientific socialism, with the
dialectics at heart and the dialectical method in mind, was reduced to
orthodoxy
and dogma. All emancipatory and revolutionary fire were taken from its
very
essence. „Marxists“ forgot to study Hegel’s „Logics“ ‑ as Lenin so
urgently
had suggested to do - and thus, they failed to apply dialectics and the
dialectical
method to their own theories and praxis, especially to „socialism“ and
„communism“
themselves. The historical results of this equivocation were
catastrophic
‑ also in Guyana. Thus, the Guianese PPP was born at a time when the
international
socialist movement had reached its revolutionary nadir, and when
Stalinist
„socialism in one country“ had reached its zenith of
„bourgeois‑democratic“
reaction. The logical contradiction of all these was that imperialism
could
recover under the United States flag, and, consequently, that Great
Britain
could direct „independence“ and „self‑government“ affairs into safe
channels
of „de‑colonisation“.
Let us now continue to
expound
the essential developments during this decisive period of Guyanese
history.
The reaction of the British Government to the Jagan‑Burnham nationalist
coalition
was to appoint another commission of investigation ‑ the Waddington
Commission. It was given the authority to revise the colonial
constitution and to pave
the road towards „self‑government“. 17)
Under the provisions of the
new constitution, general elections were hold in 1953. The
Jagan‑Burnham
PPP won 18 of the 24 contested seats. 18)
Not only within the PPP contradiction,
but already in the parliamentary opposition, a new Afro‑Guianese
national‑capitalist
tendency was gaining impetus. The other two contesting parties in the
1953
elections, the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the People’s
National
Party (PNP), strongly represented latent anti‑Indo-Guianese and
national‑capitalist interests. The British Crown reacted negatively to
the election results and demonstrated its real political and military
hegemony. It suspended the constitution
in October, 1953, and for the period 1953‑1957, a British‑nominated
ministry
and an all‑nominated legislature, as „Interim Government“ administered
Guianese
colonial matters. 19)
The reason for this negation
of Guianese Nationalism was less a result of impotence, but rather one
of
taking the opportunity to put the right man and the correct party at
the
helm of future „de‑colonisation“. The British Government knew with
certainty
who was the right figure, and, as we will see later, so did his sister,
Jessie
Burnham. 20)
That some fraternal „democratic“ help, as Japan claimed in his „West On
Trial“, came from Washington, was
just a logical minor side‑effect of the „independence“ Monopoly Game. 21)
Great Britain held all the key
cards for victory, including the one that concerned the
Guyana-Venezuela
border conflict. 22)
This unilateral
British
colonial act activated the „racial“ and „racist“ social pressures
within
the PPP, and the „race struggle“ exploded the superficial‑artificial
egg‑shell
of labour‑political nationalism. The PPP split into a Burnham and a
Jagan
faction. 23)
A nasty power struggle ensued,
a violent political vendetta engendered, which epitomised in the brutal
„race
riots“ of 1963/1964. 24)
The laughing third contestant
was British colonialism, which both factions were supposed to attack as
the
„mortal enemy“ of the subjugated colonial peoples. Guianese Nationalism
dissolved
into its two major historical component parts, which directly opposed
the
„transracial“ class interests of the working peoples. In honour of
Jagan,
and in full respect for his political errors, it must be stated that
his
position was more straightforward and honest. This is the reason, why
his
PPP will later generate its own contradiction, the WPA.
In 1957, the Renison
Constitution
dictated the next set of constitutional reformist rules to shape the
future
of British Guiana. 25)
During the general elections,
that followed in the same year, the Jagan PPP won 9 seats, the Burnham
PPP
3, and the newly formed United Democratic Party (UDP) and the
Amerindian
Party (AP) each could secure one. 26)
In October, 1957, Burnham officially
proclaimed his political direction: he founded a new party, the
people’s
National Congress (PNC). Thereby, he undersigned the stark political
reality
of Guianese seriocomic games. He began to set the „socialist“ sails of
the
Guianese boat, raised the British‑American „independence“ flag, steered
towards
Guyanese „self‑government“, driven along by the mighty „winds of
change“
of „cooperative socialism“.
In 1963/1964, British
Colonialism,
for the last time, applied its old „divide and rule“ tactics, including
its
„racial“ ideological components, in British Guiana. That these efforts
bore
fruits, precisely illustrated the fertile Guianese soil for such
colonial‑capitalist endeavours. Later, Burnham will fully exploit this
„racial“ social fertility, to further his own „co‑operative socialist“
interests. Severe social violence
and bloody „race riots“ erupted in British Guiana. Of course, the brunt
of
the bestiality was experienced mainly by the Indo-Guianese majority. 27)
The subsequent investigations
of the Wynn Parry Commission illustrated the national and international
dimensions
of these „racial conflicts“ within Guianese Nationalism. 28)
Under a revised
constitution,
whose salient feature was „proportional representation“, general
elections
were again held in December, 1964. The PPP won 24 seats (45.8% of the
votes,
the PNC 22 seats (40.5%) and the United Force 7 seats (12.4%). 29)
Burnham formed a coalition government
with Peter Stanislaus D’Aguiar’s United Force. In this way, a
„socialist-national‑capitalist“
government, headed by British Premier Burnham, appeared on the British
Guiana
political scene. PPP protests and boycotts of the London
„self‑government“
talks followed, but, all in vain; on May 26, 1966, having a monarchial
constitutional
status, Guyana was born. 30)
The Guyanese „Prince“ had introduced
the prologue to the Guyanese Machiavellian melodrama with
Rembrandtesque
overtures, and with Apartheid undertones.
During the 1963/1964
„race
riots“, at the eve of the general elections, Jessie Burnham, the sister
of
Forbes Burnham, decided to warn the Guianese about the subterranean
political
motives of her celebrated brother. Although individuals alone, surely,
do
not make history, very often, an individual leader in his social
practice
very accurately expresses and reproduces a specific trend of history,
the
deepest aspirations of certain social groups or classes. When his party
has
conquered State power, he becomes the impersenation of this historic
process.
As long as he represents and defends such class interests, he remains
in
power; if he betrays them, his historical role terminates. In the
character
and personality of Burnham, we can trace the egoistic, undemocratic,
unsocialistic,
megalomaniac political tendency which entered Guyanese social reality
ever
since the 1960s, and which is more alive than ever today. Furthermore
interfamily
quarrels are often emotional and biased, but when criticism becomes
verified
empirically and scientifically over two decades, then it is worth
paying
attention to it. For these reasons we will quote extensively some
passages
from it: Jessie Burnham’s brochure ,“ Beware My Brother Forbes”. 31)
Concerning Burnham’s
inhuman,
undemocratic political tactics, which reflect PNC methods in general,
Jessie
wrote:
„I have watched this
brilliant
brother use his brain to scheme, to plot to put friend against friend,
neighbour
against neighbour, and relative against relative. I have watched him
use
this one and that one and then quickly discard them when they have
served
their purpose. I have watched him, with this clever wit and charm,
manipulate
people like puppets on a string.“ 32)
About the
Machiavellian
„Prince“ and his political chess game, she related:
„His motto is the
personal
ends of power justify ANY means used to achieve them. His bible is The
Prince
by Machiavelli. And we the people should he come to power will be only
pawns
in his endless game of self‑advancement. Make no mistake about it, the
attraction
of political life for Forbes is the attainment of the power and the
glory.
The number of times he has ignored the offer of a coalition (by the
PPP)
supports this.“ 33)
How Burnham directed
his
party and Guyana ever since, she described:
„Today, he runs his
Party
like the way King Christopher once ran Haiti. ... Freedom, the liberty
of
speech, worship and the press. Would these freedoms continue under my
brother?
... That his love for personal power is so great he will trade anything
to
achieve it. That nothing is safe, no person, no liberty ... that stands
in
his way. ... Behind that jest, that charm, that easy oratory is a
certain
dark strain of cruelty which only surfaces when one of his vital
interests
is threatened. There are two Burnhams: the charming and the cruel. I
say
BEWARE of both“. 34)
Let us now surview the
economic
material base on which Guyana was granted political independence.
Besides,
let us circumscribe the economic measures taken by the Burnham‑D’Aguiar
coalition
government to transform that colonial‑capitalist structure. Certainly,
in
a realistic and pragmatic sense, even if Burnham had true socialist
goals,
within the context of historical realities of the late 1960s, he had no
chance
to perform economic miracles within a short period of time. At any
event,
to pursue his „love for personal power“, at first, he had to get rid of
his
troublesome coalition partner „by ANY means“. This he achieved in the
1968
general elections, when he „quickly discarded“ D’Aguiar, after he had
„served
his purpose“. However, one thing is crystal‑clear, whatever strategies
were
necessary to place Guyana on a viable economic footing, the last method
to
apply was to accept the Puerto Rican model of economic planning, which
characterised
the introduction of United States neocolonialism in the Carribean and
elsewhere during that epoch. Precisely this the „socialist ‑
national‑capitalist“ government
did, revealing the true historic tnendency of Guyanese economico
political
developments. The appearance forms of political opportunism, that is,
of
vacillation between „East“ and „West“ in the years to come, in no way
changes
the essence of this historical process.
British Colonialism
had
presented Guianese Nationalism with a healthy colonial-capitalist
socio‑economic
material structure. Since 1966, a new historical contradiction was
created:
World Imperialism versus PNC „National‑Socialism“, later also
euphemistically
called „Co‑operative Socialism“. The PNC Afro‑Guianese bureaucratic
elite
not only wanted to play an intermediate role within the context of
neo‑colonialism,
it also wanted the largest possible part of the imperialist spolia
opima.
Let us now demonstrate the extent of British and world imperialist
plunder,
already in the 1960s, with some statistical data.
The Demerara Electric
Company,
a Canadian subsidiary, with an original investment of G$ 500,000
anually
made, after tax reduction, an over 100% profit – G$ 500,000 to G$
750,000.
35)
In 1971, a document of the Guyana
Bauxite Co. (GUYBAU) claimed that the Demerara Bauxite Co. DEMBA, a
wholly‑owned
subsidiary of the Aluminium Company of Canada (ALCAN), which is again a
subsidiary
of the United Sates ALCOA, had taken out of Guyana „over half a billion
US
dollar worth of bauxite“, of which amount, Guyana „received only a bare
1.3%“
between 1918 and 1971. 36)
By 1969, ALCAN itself deployed
the equivalent of G$ 5 billion worth of assets and had an income of
over
G$ 2.6 billion. 37)
The last figure comprised over
five times of the GDP of Guyana in the late 1960s.
In accordance with the
Puerto
Rican Model and the economic plans of the „Alliance for Progress“ and
the
United Nations Economic Commission of Latin America (UCLA), Guyana
launched
its First Development Programme. Aided by other pro‑capitalist
advisers,
the G$ 300 Million Development Plan (1966‑1972) was drawn up by the
eminent
West‑Indian economist, Sir Arthur Lewis. Noteworthy, is that Burnham
and
D’Aguiar (the Minister of Finance) heavily depended on pro‑capitalist
economic
advisers such as W. Davenport, the US economic adviser to the Prime
Minister,
and Horst Bocklemann, the West German Governor of the Central Bank of
Guyana.
38)
This plan was essentially based
an a strategy of „industrialisation by invitation“ and oriented at
attracting
foreign capital investments by offering very favourable incentives. In
reality,
it was aimed at neglecting industry and agriculture, because three
quarters
of the expenditure was directed at infrastructural developments, to
build
roads, to supply electricity, etc. 39)
In general, the Government’s
economic policy towards the major industries ‑ sugar, rice and bauxite
‑
remained essentially pro‑capitalistic, anti‑nationalistic and
conservative.
In any case, to have nationalised these industries in the 1960s would
have
meant economic hari‑kiri, in due respect of the demands of the PPP and
the
Ratoon Group 40)
for such an early unpragmatic
move. If nationalisation should be one of the material conditions to
introduce
socialism, then, at least, all the material and intellectual conditions
should
be existent, to make nationalisation itself possible. Many
„Third‑World“
countries had to learn this maxim of dialectics the very hard way.
In accordance with his
own
plans, Burnham signed a 25‑year agreement with Reynolds Metals Company
to
exploit bauxite. Besides, his Government agreed to freeze income tax
and
royalties during that period. In the sugar industry, Government shares
were
restricted to a mere 5%, which practically gave Booker Brothers
McConnell
a monopoly to direct economic life. Even where overseas marketing was
concerned,
the US trading company, Cornnel Rice and Sugar Company, dominated the
commercial
field. 41)
The above selected
data
should suffice to elucidate the economic state of affairs and the
direction
of Guyanese economic processes in the late 1960s. Consequently,
Guyana’s
„self‑goverrmant“ was based on a very slippery imperialist platform,
its
first development plan necessitated the mobilisation of G$ 245 million
from
foreign capitalist resources. This programme had nothing to do with
economic
aid from „socialist“ sources, in fact, deliberately, relations to the
„East“
were reduced to the least possible. This „socialist“ utopia, to receive
material
help from the ex‑colonial and imperialist masters, was only negligibly
realised.
By 1968, mainly because the United Force was still a desirable obstacle
to
the PNC’s squandermania, half of the G$ 62 million private investments
did
come from overseas capitalist sources. Also, the USA, the UK, UN
agencies
and the World Bank supplied G$ 140 million in economic aid, but, this
sum
was not enough to boost the economic development plan, and was not
sufficient
to establish a viable economy. 42)
The logical result of this PNC-UF
economic policy of gambling with capital of their „opponents“, was that
Guyana
became indebted to the very historical sources which had granted it
„flag“
independence. Guyana’s foreign debt increased remarkably: from G$ 107
million
in 1961 to G$ 319 million by 1971. 43)
It will surpass the G$ 2.5 billion
mark in the early 1980s.
On the other hand, the
success
of the economic plan also depended on increased production and
productivity. Concerning the latter, where
an Indo‑Guyanese majority
progressively is being thrown out of political life and economic
decision‑making,
productivity surely will not flourish. As already mentioned before, as
workers,
they dominate the important sugar and rice sectors of the economy,
Furthermore,
it depended on direct and indirect taxation. The latter, for example,
rose
from G$ 2.79 million in 1966 to G$ 15.1 million in 1969. 44)
Guyana rapidly developed to
one of the world’s heaviest tax‑earners; by 1984, the budget had very
little left to tax anymore. 45)
That prevented the above factors to „rescue“ the economy from
continuous and continuative decomposition, was what the application of
the Puerto Rican model had generated chronic unemployment,
especially among the youth, which formed a significant part of the
active
working population. In general, unemployment rose to about 30%, and to
about
50% among the youth workers. 46)
One of the factors responsible
for this socio‑economic degeneration, was that agriculture and industry
were
neglected.
The fall in production
and
productivity, the skyrocketting of cost‑of‑living prices, the
escalation
of unemployment, the increase of corruption and criminality and the
acceleration of direct and indirect taxation, all these, contributed to
the early collapse of the First Development Plan. On a social level, to
avoid starvation and malnutrition, which would have generated „labour
disturbances“ and „race riots“,
the Government had to increase its food importation bill ‑ a capitalist
anomaly
in a country as rich as Guyana in food resources. 47)
It rose from G$ 25 million in
1960 to G$ 38 million in 1970. 48)
Already a year after its introduction,
the programme had to suffer a devaluation of the Guyanese dollar; one
of
the earliest consequences of PNC betrayal to the goals of true
anti‑colonialism
was to establish immediately firm ties with the International Monetary
Fund
(IMF). What this meant, after the introduction of „co‑operative
socialism“
in the 1970s, we will see later. By 1984, even the IMF refused to help
the
bankrupt PNC policies and economy. 49)
By 1971, the development programme
completely broke down, and the PNC Government decided to embark on the
omnibenevolent
„socialist“ Second Development Plan, the Feed, Clothe And House the
Nation
(FCHN) Programme, 1972‑1976. 50)
Let us just briefly
summarise
what this economic bankruptcy reflected on the politic level. The
United
Force, Burnham’s coalition partner, represented Iberio-Guyanese
national
capitalist interests, which contradicted PNC bureaucratic elitist
economic
aspirations. Finance Minister D’Aguiar had introduced legal measures to
enable
his national capitalist class to invest abroad; he himself had
„Guyanised“
his huge concern, Banks DIH Ltd., which mainly concentrated in the
production
of beer, liquor and non‑alcoholic beverages. Thus, a non‑Afro‑Guianese
national class was gaining a stronghold on the Guyanese economy. By
„ANY means“, this politico‑economic process had to be stopped, and its
tendency had to be directed
by the PNC State, towards „co‑operative socialism“. Burnham made use of
the
very first opportunity to realise his political goal. By means of
fraudulent
methods and massive „rigging”, that is, inter alia, by padding of the
electoral
role, by proxy voting of the dead, the under‑age and phantom voters, in
the
1968 general elections, his PNC won the absolute majority, by obtaining
30
seats out of 53. 51)
The road was now open to inaugurate
the Co‑operative Republic of Guyana on February 23, 1970, with Forbes
Burnham
as its first Prime Minister. 52)
Let us summarise the
economic
realities of Guyana between „independence“ and „republic“, in order to
give
a material background to the political move towards „nationalisation”
in
the 1970s. According to a Labour Force Survey of 1965, and other
statistical
data, supplied by Ved P. Duggal, in 1966, Guyana’s per capita GDP (at
factor
cost, and in current prices) had risen to G$ 515 (1972: G$ 1 = US$
0.50).
53)
More than 53% of this GDP was
generated by sugar, mining (mostly bauxite), distribution and
government
sectors. 54)
Between 1960 and 1964, the average
rate of growth of per capita GDP „has been about 3.5% per year“. 55)
In 1968 (the year of the conquest
of State power by the PNC), compared to 1967, the GDP increased in real
terms
by about 5%. Over the next years, it increased at a similar rate, and
it
reached G$ 500 million in 1971 (when „nationalisation“ began). 56)
1972‑1973, real growth of production
stagnated, and in 1974, an upward trend was registered again. 57)
A PNC Government booklet confirmed
the evolution of this economic process in the pre-Republican period:
„Economic
development in Guyana during the years 1967-1971 has been sustained at
an
appreciably high rate, Gross Domestic Product at current factor cost
rose
from G$ 378. 5 million in 1967 to G$ 412. 2 million in 1968; in 1969,
GDP
rose to G$ 445. 9 million, by 1970 GDP was G$ 472. 9 million and in
1971
the GDP reached the half billion mark (G$ 500 million)“. 58)
Throughout the period 1967‑1971, the real growth rate of the GDP
„averaged a minimum of five per cent, per annum“. 59)
What do the above
figures
signify, in the light of what has been stated earlier, i.e., in
relation
to productivity and production? It simply means that the ratio of GDP
to
total labour force was negligent. The real income growth had not kept
pace
with population growth during that period. As mentioned before, the
„healthy
colonial‑capitalist structure“, which Guyana had inherited, retained
the
economic weakness of all „developing“ countries, that is, potentially
to
stagnate. Duggal: „The ratio of GDP to total labour force was about G$
1700
in 1965, G$ 1652 in 1966, G$ 1663 in 1967, G$ 1660 in 1968, and G$ 1666
in
1969“. 60)
During that period,
the
Guyanese economy was dependent on two major capital‑intensive sectors,
the
sugar and bauxite industries. 61)
As stated already, they were again dependent on foreign trade and
capital. The 1966‑1972 development plan
generated an asymmetric development between agriculture, industry and
infrastructure.
Consequently, it caused an even more unbalanced economic process. The
entrance
of British Guiana into CARIFTA, in 1965, did not alleviate this
problem,
on the contrary, it furthered US „equal partnership“ interests. All
these
have to be seen in the context of Guyanese application of the Puerto
Rican
model in 1966, when it had already collapsed in Puerto Rico at the
beginning
of the 1960s.
After Guyana became a
co‑operative
republic in 1970, one of the first measures which the PNC government
adopted,
was to „own and control“ the country’s national resources by means of
„nationalisation“.
As we will see, this concretely meant accumulation of State capital to
finance
the interests of the rising PNC bureaucratic national‑capitalist elite.
In 1970, Burnham attended the Non‑Aligned Summit Conference in Lusaka,
Zambia:
He made use of the opportunity to make a „foreign policy safari“, to
study
„African Socialism“, co‑operativism and „nationalisation“ in Zambia,
Tanzania
and Uganda. From Obote’s party, he borrowed the political slogan: One
People,
One Nation, One Destiny. 62)
Within the new
contradiction
which developed, that is, PNC State capitalism versus Word Imperialism,
Burnham
introduced his „socialist“ ideology, an appearance form, to veil the
essence
of his capitalist, oppressive and exploitative interests.
Opportunistically,
he developed his own version of „African Socialism“ and gave it a
camouflaging, non‑aligned, anti‑imperialist foreign policy.
„Nationalisation“ was the economic
tool to give veracity to his noble „cooperative socialist“ ideals. Let
us
now elucidate how a „purchase agreement“ was masked as
„nationalisation“ of
DEMBA, the Guyanese subsidiary of the Aluminium Company of Canada (
ALCAN
).
Having studied Kenneth
Kaunda’s
nationalisation (majority shares control), the PNC suggested government
„majority participation“ to the ALCAN representatives of the Guyana
bauxite industry. They were not fascinated, and offered at most „equal
partnership“. However,
let us briefly illustrate Guyana’s bauxite industry, in order to
demonstrate
its relevance for the Guyanese economy, and why the PNC government
began
its nationalisation drive with ALCAN.
Guyana’s bauxite
industry
dates back to 1916, when Bain Mackenzie began operations at Three
Friends
on the east bank of the Demerara River. 63)
At the time of Guyana’s „independence“,
already two US bauxite mining companies were active in the country:
Demerara
Bauxite Company (DEMBA) and Reynolds (Guyana) Mines Ltd. DEMBA, the
largest
mining company, was a wholly‑owned subsidiary of ALCAN, which again was
a
Canadian subsidiary of the huge US multi‑national, ALCOA. By 1971,
Guyana
was producing dried (metal grade) bauxite, calcined bauxite and
alumina.
At that time, Guyana ranked fourth among the world’s bauxite producers;
it
supplied almost 90% of the world’s calcined bauxite. 64)
The latter was the most important
foreign exchange and profit‑earner. Together with sugar and rice
exports,
it formed one of the main pillars of the vulnerable, unstable, Guyanese
neocolonial
capitalist economy. For example, in 1972, bauxite production was
contributing
to just under 20% of Guyana’s GNP and to about 40% of foreign exchange
earnings.
In an „Address to the
Nation“
of February 23, 1971, President Burnham gave the following alarming
figures
of ALCAN bauxite exploitation: „At this stage it is apposite to note
that
ALCAN in 1969 deployed the equivalent of G$ 5 billion worth of assets
and
had an income of over G$ 2.6 billion…. Guyana over the last fifty odd
years
received less than 3% of the profits accruing from the exploitation of
her
bauxite“. 65)
In April, 1970, at the 13th
Annual Congress of the PNC, its leadership „enunciated the basic and
fundamental
principle of ‘Ownership and Control’ of our resources for and by
Guyanese“.
66)
A year later, on March 1, 1971,
the Guyana parliament by a majority vote of 48 to 3 passed the „Bauxite
Nationalisation
Act“. 67)
It is relevant to note that
between 1966 and 1970, in general, the PNC had opposed nationalisation,
as a result of its pro-imperialist foreign policy. It was the PPP, in
line with Soviet foreign policy, which had demanded nationalisation.
Later, when the
PPP gave birth to its negation, beginning with the genesis of the
Ratoon
Group (the original nucleus of the WPA in the late 1960s) 68),
other extraparliamentary groups,
with a Maoist orientation, voiced similar economic demands. Around
1970,
this „nationalisation“ fever, coming from the opposition, favoured
Burnham
in the actualisation of his State‑capitalist dreams. This is the reason
why
so many non‑PNC parliamentarians supported the passing of the
above‑mentioned
act.
Thus, on July 15,
1971,
the ALCAN plant at Linden (renamed after Linden F.S. Burnham) was
nationalised
and the Guyana Bauxite Company (GUYBAU) was born. The mutual agreement
revealed
the purchasing essence of this formal „socialist“ move: „The government
of
Guyana will pay to ALCAN a sum of G$ 107 million (US$ 53 million), over
a
period of no more than 20 years with interest at 6% subject to
withholding
tax“. 69)
The PPP commented: „... the
agreed price was US$ 53.5 million with 6% interest (Government figures
of
compensation). Figures from other sources have disclosed that the
amount
was higher. The nationalised bauxite complex will cost the Guyanese
people
G$ 160 million with a repayment period of 20 years. In addition the
government
borrowed US$ 8 million from Chase Manhattan Bank to help in the
nationalisation
of ALCAN“. 70)
It follows that the PPP and
other oppositional groups had favoured nationalisation, but not the PNC
compensation type. As already indicated, State control of principal
sectors of the economy or even State ownership of main industries does
not necessarily mean the introduction
of socialism. It can very well be utilised to consolidate elitist
bureaucratic
class rule. 71)
Historical events
confired
that the „nationalisation“ of ALCAN, in reality, did not cause any
anxiety
among the representatives of either Reynolds or Booker Bros. It was by
no
means a rupture with foreign capital. For example, GUYBAU’s selling
agent
for bauxite on the world market, Philipp Bros., with its head‑quarters
in
New York, is a wholly‑owned subsidiary of Engelhard Minerals and
Chemical
Corporation (USA), which again is a subsidiary company of the
multi-national
giant, Anglo American Corporation. In 1970, Engelhard had total assets
of
US$ 624,498,000 and its net sales and operating revenues amounted to
US$
1,473,656,000. 72)
The marketing of this company
was Guyana’s bauxite selling agent.
Since 1971, a real PNC
„cooperative
socialist” nationalisation epidemic broke out. In 1972, the ownership
of
Guyana Timbers Ltd. passed into PNC Government hands. In 1973 the
Government
„assumed ownership, for housing and agriculture, of all unused and idle
lands
owned or possessed by the sugar companies“. 73)
In 1975, the nationalisation
of Reynolds (1.1.1975) and of Jessel‑Holdings (26.5.1975) followed. In
1976,
Booker McConnell (26.5.1976) and Sprastans (1.1.1976) had to believe in
all
these „socialist“ illusions. 74)
By then, the PNC had declared
itself as a „socialist vanguard party“, had developed an ideology of
„Marxism-Leninism“,
and had declared its „paramountcy over the Government“. 75)
In the next section,
we
will expound the political acme of „co‑operative socialism“, 1970‑1976,
by
making special reference to its Declaration of Sophia (1974), its
Second
Development Plan, 1972‑1976, and its foreign policy, generated from
this
national politico‑economic base. We will conclude this part, by
summarising
Guyana’s foreign policy during the period prior to the Co‑operative
Republic.
Of significance is to note how Guyanese political processes affected
national
economic developments, and vice versa, and how both determined foreign
policy.
Special reference will be made to the Venezuela‑Guyana border conflict
which
is an example par excellence of PNC opportunistic political manoeuvres.
Guyana’s
foreign policy between 1966 and 1970 was mainly dictated by her PNC
Minister
for External Affairs, Shridath Surendranath „Sonny“ Ramphal. 76)
Already in the pre‑„independence“
period, he had been instrumental in the negotiations to form CARIFTA on
May
1, 1965. In 1969, he expressed the general trend of Guyanese foreign
policy,
which was moving from an open pro‑imperialist position towards
„non‑alignment“:
„... our external relations must be guided by a policy of
non‑alignment.
Non‑alignment, not in sterile withdrawal from international
opinion‑making,
but in an avoidance of becoming a mere apperdage to international power
‑
in retention of a right of choice and whatever freedom of action is
possible
in a world not generous to freedom“. 77)
However, Ramphal’s personal
views about foreign policy and Guyanese political realities did not
synchronise
very well.
Nonetheless as early
as
June 1965, Burnham „had laid the cornerstone“ to Guyana’s future
foreign
policy when „he promulgated the stand that Guyana shall be no man’s
satellite;
shall be no man’s slave’’. 78)
In March 1976, he was more explicit
when he declared in parliament that Guyana „shall be pawn of neither
East
nor West“, and that „neither of the super powers or great blocs can
depend
on automatic support“. 79)
With one example we will demonstrate
the political reality of this non‑aligned „sweet‑talk“. Not even a year
earlier,
on May 26, 1966, the US base at Timehri „was returned to the people of
Guyana“;
about the secret military pact concerning United States use of the
Atkinson
Airfield, which was signed by Burnham himself, no word was lost. 80)
Inter alia, the secret pact
contained „non‑aligned“ privileges such as: „the armed forces of the
United
States of America are authorised to overfly Guyana and to use the
Timehri
Airport on a temporary basis, for unlimited periods of time and as
often
as they wish“. 81)
This right was granted unconditionally,
negating the principle of „non‑alignment“ as expressed by Ramphal and
Burnham.
We could cite many more examples of Guyanese political verbalism and
wishful‑thinking;
however, within the general context of what follows, these will become
apparent.
Certainly, in the
pro‑imperialist
period, 1966‑1970, latent political moves towards „non‑alignment“ were
in
process. By February 1972, Guyana did have a complement of 11 missions
abroad.
Among them were missions at the United Nations, in Venezuela, Suriname
and
Jamaica. At the same time, she established diplomatic relations with
about
30 other countries, among them were the U.S.S.R., Israel, India,
Brazil,
Dominican Republic and Zambia. Of course, apart from this major
„non‑alignment“
thrust, cordial relations were established with the U.S.A., Canada,
U.K.,
Japan, and Federal Republic of Germany. 82)
Basically, however, during the 1966–1970 period, Guyana had taken „a
virulent anti-communist, anti‑Soviet and anti‑Cuba position”. 83)
She supported US foreign policy
on the People’s Republic of China, which ranged from strong opposition,
to
a „two‑Chinas“ position, to an eventual support of China’s admision to
the
United Nations. 84)
Already in 1965, this tendency
was evident when she defended the US landing of 45,000 marines in the
Dominican
Republic. Concerning „Vietnam policy“ she supported the US line that
all
troops should be withdrawn. On the other hand, although Guyana was
hosted by the People´s Republic of China in 1971, trade and cultural
relations remained
negligible. Only on June 27, 1972, officially diplomatic relations were
established.
85)
Concerning diplomatic relations with the USSR, which exist since 1971,
initially, they remained merely formal and nominal. 86)
Only towards 1973, diplomatic and other relations were extended‑ to
other „socialist“ countries like Cuba,
Yugoslavia, Democratic Republic of Germany, Rumania and Poland. About
the vacillating foreign policy, we will comment more in the following
section.
The history of the
Guyana‑Venezuelan
limitrofe problem, from its origin until the Geneva Agreement in 1966,
has
been expounded in various scientific publications. 87)
On the basis of the acceptance
of the controversial 1899 Paris Arbitral Award, in 1932, Venezuela,
Great
Britain and Brazil had fixed the trijunction point at which the borders
of
Venezuela, British Guiana and Brazil meet, on the peak of Mount
Roraima.
88)
On February 8, 1944, one of
the members of the United States/Venezuela Boundary Commission of
1896‑97,
Severo Mallet‑Prevost, a relatively junior lawyer on the Venezuelan
team,
dictated a memorandum. 89)
In it, he „accused his deceased
colleagues of entering into an illicit political deal and of
deliberately
coming to a false decision“ 90)
to the disadvantage of Venezuela.
This occurred about a month after he had received the Venezuelan Award
‑
the Order of the Liberator. In his memorandum, he stated that the
unanimous
final decision of 1899 „was unjust to Venezuela and deprived her of
very
extensive and important territory to which, in my opinion, Great
Britain
had not the shadow of a right“. 91)
This document led to
the
re‑opening of the Guyana‑Venezuelan border dispute at the beginning of
the
1960s. However, in Feburary, 1966, while British Guiana was still a
British
Colony, the Geneva Agreement, was signed by British Guiana, Venezuela
and
Great Britain. 92)
It established a Mixed Commission
of Venezuelan and Guianese representatives to seek „satisfactory
solutions
for the practical settlement of the controversy between Venezuela and
the
United Kingdom which has arisen as the result of the Venezuelan
contention
that the Arbitral Award of 1899 about the frontier between British
Guiana
and Venezuela is null and void“. 93)
In September 1966, the
new
South American state, Guyana, was admitted to the United Nations, at a
time
when the above‑mentioned commission had its second sitting. However, in
the
same Month, the „Ankoko Affair“ occurred. Ankoko is an island situated
is
the Cuyuni border river. Its eastern half was declared Guianese
territory
by the Boundary Commission of 1905. 94)
Ramphal protested in front of
the United Nations by declaring: „Venezuela brazenly occupied the
Guyana
half of the island of Ankoko, an island of strategic importance in one
of
the border rivers between our countries. .... To compound the
aggression,
Venezuelan armed forces have established upon the island an airstrip
capable
of accommodating military aircraft and have turned the island itself
into
a military fortress“. 95)
Prime Mister Burnham on radio
admonished the Guyanese to remain calm. He told them that „not a blade
of
grass“ would be conceded to the Venezuelans. 96)
The historic truth is that,
since nearly two decades, inumerous blades of Venezuelan grass are
covering
the island. 97)
This Venezuelan „aggression“
suited Burnham’s future plans to irradicate PNC „paramountcy“ and
dictatorship.
He converted political folly into militarisation of Guyana.
The Rupununi, Guyana’s
southernmost
district, lies near the Brazilian and Venezuelan boundaries. Its major
industry
was cattle‑ranching, which was then carried on in the south by the
Rupununi
Development Company, and in the north by two families of mixed
European‑Amerindian
ancestry. At that time, about 10,000 Amerindians, in scattered
villages,
populated the region. Some of them worked as ranch hands for the
above‑mentioned farmers; others were occupied with balata collecting
for sale.
The „insurrection“
originated
because some private ranchers feared that the future PNC government
would
refuse to renew their grazing rights. A small number of Amerindians
also
shared their anxiety. These rebels killed six persons, including five
policemen.
Within two days, a contingent of the newly‑established Guyana Defence
Force
(1965) crushed the rebellion. Some 70 Amerindians were rumoured to have
been
killed in this agressive military campaign, 98)
which was titulated as a „follow up operation to purge the rats out of
their holes“. 99)
However, the „leaders“ managed
to flee; instead of them,“several“ persons were arrested, and ten of
them
put to trial in Georgetown. Before Justice Arthur Chung (later
president
of Guyana), seven were acquitted, and the jury failed to come to a
verdict
concerning the remaining three. Eventually, on June 2, 1970, the
director
of public Prosecution entered a nolle prosequi in favour of them, and
they
were set free. 100)
What concerns us, in
relation
to foreign policy, is that the „ringleaders“ of the „insurrection“ fled
to
Brazil and Venezuela. This action caused international reactions which
affected
Guyana’s relations to her neighbours. The rebels claimed that they were
oppressed
by the Guyana regime and consequently wanted to set up an independent
Rupununi
Republic. Twenty‑nine of them are supposed to have obtained political
asylum
in Venezuela. 101)
The fact of the matter is
that the PNC-UF government had neglected the Amerindian peoples. The
subsequent
PNC regime manipulated and ignored them. Consequently, a coincidence of
social interests developed between them and the ranchers, which
eventually annoyed
the Guyana administration.
However, this incident
also
reflected the contradiction within the PNC-UF coalition, and the
attitudes
of both opposing partners vis‑a‑vis the border dispute. Madam Hart, a
candidate
of the UF, declared on Venezuelan television that she was the
„President“
of Essequibo, and on the basis of such untruths, she asked Venezuela to
intervene on her behalf. To drive her point home, she utilised the
political „sore‑points“ of that epoch: „She warned Venezuelans then
that the PNC was communist and
that one day they might very well have their ‘Bay of Pigs’ in the
Essequibo“.
102)
Ramphal, by declaring the
above as another „violation“ of the Geneva Agreement, countered by
arguing
that, already in 1966, Venezuelan diplomatic personnel in Guyana were
engaged
in clandestine subversive activities among „Guyana’s indigenous
Amerindian community“. The expelled Second Secretary of the Venezuelan
Embassy in Georgetown
„was responsible for organising and financing a secret meeting of
Amerindian
tribes in Guyana and attempting to induce them to express support for
the
Venezuelan claim“. 103)
In addition, he accused Venezuela
of „political and economic aggression“. She had secured „the exclusion
of
Guyana from the Organisation of American States“, and had prevented a
signatory
to the Treaty of Tlateloco ‑ the Latin American Denuclearisation
Treaty.
Furthermore, he rebuked Venezuela for having anrounced to the world, in
the
London Times of 15th June, 1968, „its refusal to recognise any
concessions
granted by the Government of Guyana to companies operating in the area
of
Guyana which Venezuela lays claim“. 104)
Also, on June 9th, 1968, a
Venezuelan decree purported to annex and to assert sovereign right
„over
a 9 ‑ mile belt of sea extending to within three miles of the coast of
Guyana
and contiguous to Guyana’s territorial waters“. 105)
Such an aggressive political atmosphere by no means favoured
„satisfactory solutions“ or any „practical settlement“ of the border
conflict ‑ on the contrary, progressively they contributed
to the final stale‑mate of 1970.
All these political
events
enabled Burnham to play his anti‑communist „trump“ card: his revelation
of
Cuban ‑ M.I.R. involvement in a „plot“ to overthrow his government. The
reactionary
essence of the „Beria Plot“ is a remarkable example of Burnham’s
perennial
summersaults in foreign policy. It was Burnham’s last overt
anti‑socialist
rigmarole, in spite of PNC claims that it had been „socialist“ ab ovo. 106)
Let us give some verbatim examples
of Burnham’s views, concerning his relations to the Soviet Union and
Cuba
between 1962 and 1968: „... the Cubans,
who Castro
had given no vote do not have a vote here and I do not propose to give
them“.
(Burnham, 1962) 107)
“... this is no time to advertise
that you want the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to come and take over
your
economy ... a small nation like our own have got to accept certain
geographical
facts ... we have got to be sure that we do not become a russian
colony“.
(Burnham, 1962) 108)
In a press conference
of
November 30, 1968, concerning the „Beria Plot”, he stated: „M.I.R.,
therefore,
represents in Venezuela the Castroite movement for organised violence
and
guerrilla warfare. .... In fact, within the last few days, we have been
in
close communications with the Venezuelan authorities on this matter –
exchanges which have been of much value in
advancing the necessary
and continuing enquiries“. 109)
We will refrain to comment
on these quotations, but, if we recollect that the above statement was
made
only 5 weeks after Ramphal’s truculent attacks on Venezuela in the
United
Nations, then Burnham certainly revealed his true schizophrenic
political
nature.
Concerning the „Beria
Plot“,
which has been expounded in other publications 110),
and which does not really merit scientific investigation within our
context of analysis, we will just quote a significant passage which
demonstrates Burnham’s „revolutionary“
trend of the late 1960s: „We know why Beria came to Guyana. ... Beria
is
a terrorist guerrilla. He has lived by the gun, fighting the Venezuelan
Government
on behalf of Cuba. He is a man of violence trained in its techniques.
Violence,
or the expertise of violence, was the one thing he had to offer in
exchange“.
111)
In 1975, after he had supported Angolan „terrorist guerrillas“, Burnham
held a speech at Cienfuegos, in Cuba, and stated: „...
your victory of January 1, 1959,
we consider as our own. Since then (sic!) we have identified you, the
people
of Cuba, as the leaders in a new revolution; a revolution which seeks
as
its objectives the freeing of Latin America, in fact, the freeing of
the
underdeveloped world”. 112)
On April 9, 1975, Burnham
was awarded the Jose Marti National Order; on which occasion, President
Dorticos emphasised „Guyana’s position under your leadership“ on
„topics of contemporary international affairs“. 113)
We do not know whether
Burnham
fooled Castro with his „just, charm and easy oratory“ (Jessie), or vice
versa,
but the decoration with the Jose Marti medal surely had very little in
common
with the Che Guevara revolutionary spirit of the Sierra Maestra. True
politics
or foreign policy, like real charity, begins at home, where its
material
essence, is located. History, which generates Truth, surely cannot
„absolve“
Burnham from his political opportunism and insincerity.
In 1970, the Mixed
Commission
had ended its four-year term, without reaching any settlement. Under
the
Presidency of Dr. Eric William, in June, 1970, a Protocol was signed by
Guyana,
Venezuela and Great Britain, to suspend the operation of Article IV of
the
Geneva Agreement of 1966. 114)
In effect, the dispute was frozen for an initial 12 years, until 1982.
As we will see later, Venezuela terminated this protocol in April 1982.
115)
Significant is that Burnham’s
signature confirmed that there exists de facto a Guyana/Venezuela
border
conflict. On the other hand, even Guynews, the official PNC Government
Overseas
Information Bulletin, confirmed that between 1970 and 1974 „the,
relations
between Guyana and Venezuela have been improving“. 116)
That this occurred mainly
due to Venezuelan friendly gestures, we will see later.
In this part, which
illustrated
the evolutionary process towards „Co‑operative Socialism“, we have
demonstrated
the genetic origins of Guyanese nationalism in the early trade union
movements,
in the political protests, and in the anti‑colonial resistance of the
various
oppressed peoples. The fundamental contradiction within Guyanese
nationalism
was nurtured from two main sources: from endogenous factors, generated
from
British colonialism, its historical products of „divide and rule“,
„racism“,
social discrimination, political oppression, economic exploitation,
etc.,
and, from exogenous factors, the struggle between world imperialism and
emerging
proletarian movements, contradictions within the international
socialist
movement, the conflicts between fascism, democracy and „communism“, the
international
division of labour, world wars, decolonization, etc. Since the 1950s,
Guianese
Nationalism diverged into two tendentially contradictory appearance
forms:
Burnham’s „socialism“ qua „nationalised“ neo‑colonialism, and Jagan’s
„communism“
qua „Guianised“ Soviet Neo‑Stalinism. Negating both political
tendencies,
a subterranean latency, which corresponds to the true emancipatory
aspirations
of all Guyanese working peoples, was always present, struggling to
transform
itself into a forceful tendency. Since 1960, it was located within the
PPP
and in other extraparliamentary oppositional movements as real negation
to
the PNC thrust towards „racist“ „co‑operative socialism. It follows
logically,
that PNC ideology and State rule have nothing in common with either
scientific
socialism or even scientific communism. That real „transracial’ working
class
emancipatory processes will surface in the WPA around 1980, still does
not
yet determine this political movement as the true reflection and
reproduction
of democracy and socialism in Guyana. Finally, the opposite of
„co‑operative
socialism“ in Guyana, as we have seen until now, is not capitalism,
imperialism,
or even neo-colonialism, but true democracy. In this respect,
democracy
without socialism, and conversely, socialism without democracy, form
part
of Burnham’s utopian „Cuban Cigar“ dreams. 117)
In the next part, which will deal with the materialisation of
„co‑operative socialism“ (1970‑1975), we
will notice how its substantial essence becomes empirically apparent;
thus, with concrete data we will verify further our central scientific
hypothesis, including other evident corollaries. Slowly but surely,
since 1976, „cooperative
socialism“ will take its involutionary path, that is, it will become
progressively
non-essential. During that period, Burnham continuatively demonstrated
the
true image of PNC social violence and class brutality: the „cruel face“
about
which Jessie Burnham had warned as early as 1966. But, modern dictators
always
have their fingers on the pulse of coming qualitative social changes,
they
anticipate their own downfall, long before the true democratic forces
are
conscious of their real social strength and power. In the military
dictatorship
and neo-fascist oppressive measures of Burnham’s PNC regime that is, in
the
escalation of his repressive enactments, and in general social
violence;
ever since 1975, we will encounter the counterpart of future Guyanese
historic
emancipation.
Part Two
The
Zenith of „Co-Operative Socialism”, 1970-1975
The negation of
essence
is appearance, and vice versa. In historical evolution, as a universal
process,
a social phenomenon at first appears in various intranslucent forms,
which
veils its true substantial essence. Gradually, its essence unfolds,
discarding
continuously its diaphonous appearance forms, up to a point where its
historical
truth becomes conspicuous. This happened to „co‑operative socialism”
between
1970 and 1975 that is, after all its previous evolutionary
„socialist“,“
nationalist“ ”independence“ and „non‑racial“ ideological forms had
exhibited
their true colours between 1966 and 1970. Since 1975, its decomposition
and
degeneration, in a nut‑shell, its historical involution, set in;
progressively,
its capitalist essence will become non‑essential, and eventually, it
will
meet its inevitable Hegelian „doom“. As a historical process,
„co‑operative
socialism“ is creating continuatively its own contradiction. As such,
it
reflects its direct Dialectical relation to the major contradiction,
Nature‑Society,
but, also, its indirect affinity to subordinate international
contradictions,
which unravel themselves, as class, „racial“ and capital‑labor
antagonisms.
118)
Let us enter upon our central theme by expounding the economic material
substratum of „co‑operative socialism“
as radicated in the Second Development Plan, 1972‑1976. We will
continue
to elaborate its ideological irradication in the Declaration of Sophia,
1974.
On May 8, 1973, Dr.
K.F.S.
King, Guyana’s Minister of Economic Development made the new
development
programme officially known to the public. He asserted: „To my mind the
Plan
itself succintly describes the society that we wish to mould“. 119)
Let us examine which destiny
the PNC regime was „moulding“ in the 1970s, by carefully unmasking its
reactionary
politico‑economic essence. Firstly, „co‑operative socialism“ admitted
that
between 1966 and 1973 the UF and/or PNC governments, as elaborated
before,
had generated a virulent „racism“. It now pretended to eradicate this
social
evil: „... the Guyanese national must not consider himself an Indian,
or
African, or Chinese, or European, but as Guyanese“. 120)
Secondly, Guyana must be „self‑reliant“, and, finally it must be
„egalitarian“. 121)
Concerning the latter, „the
people as a whole“ would be involved „in the formulation of national
policies
and in making decisions, which implement those policies“. 122)
Furthermore, „economic power“ would lie in the hands of the totality of
Guyanese. Any rational, pragmatic person, acquainted with contemporary
realities, would just sneer at such political
infantilism.
The objectives of the
programme
included the „creation of employment opportunities“, „equal
distribution
of incomes“, „equitable geographic distribution of economic activities“
and
the attainment of „self‑sustained economic growth“. 123)
Its „main thrust“ would be directed towards „feeding, clothing and
housing ourselves“. 124)
The plan envisaged to spend
G$ 1,150 million over the five‑year period. This then, was the
programme
to launch „socialism“, by carefully circumventing its historical sine
qua
non: a „peaceful“ or violent‑social revolution, that is, qualitative
social transformation of a previous non‑essential status quo by human
productive theory-praxis.
Let us select and
highlight
just one central aspect of this programme. For the construction of
housing
units, what target did King’s government set for itself? „As is
well‑known
the target that we have set is 65,000 housing units. We have already
built
5,000 of these in 1972, and our plan is to increase the tempo of
building
activity to 8,000 in 1973, 13,000 in 1974, 17,000 in 1975 and 22,000 in
1976“.
125)
And from where would the G$
250 million materialise, to finance this urgent necessity? Of course,
true
to its former „beggar“ policy, the PNC hoped that the „imperialist”,
and
their monetary institutions would dig their own graves, would finance
„socialism“
‑ that is, usher in their own historical demise. Also, it was taken for
granted
that production and productivity would increase, that currencies would
not
fluctuate, that export and import prices would remain stable and that
the
weather would remain fine. The PPP sarcastically commented; „The plan
is
laudible in its intentions, but naive and utopian in its outlook and
mechanism“.
126)
By 1976, Burnham had
neither
clothed, nor housed or fed the nation. In his „Address to the Nation“
of
December 14, 1976, he lamented about the critical „housing“ situation:
„We
promised to house the nation ... by 1976. We have not done so .... Our
statistics
show, however, ... that we have built 33,000 units. The rest of the
nation
is still to be housed“. 127)
However, the Prime Minister equivocated by means of a slight
miscalculation. With accurate data, the
PPP, demonstrated that, in reality, between 1972 and 1975 only the
following
number of houses and dwelling units were constructed: 1972: 1,061;
1973:
1,128; 1974: 1,037; 1975: 941. 128)
What the „Comrade Leader“
also failed to pronounce distinctly is that the overwhelming majority
of
the completed houses was occupied by PNC‑friendly, Afro‑Guyanese
„election‑fodder“.
Burnham then continued to make intelligible why the FCH Programme had
collapsed
completely. Inter alia, he elaborated that the original investment sum
had
to be increased to G$ 1.5 billion, that „inflation between 1970 and
1976“
had affected building costs, that prices for materials skyrocketed,
that
„there was a shortage of cement“, that there were not „enough skilled
workmen”,
that „sugar prices fell on the world‑maxket“, etc. And, finally, the
standard
PNC exoneration was voiced: „unusual floods“ and „severe rainfall“ ‑
which
are typical for Guyana’s tropical climate ‑ affected construction,
sugar
and rice production. 129)
Space limitations do not permit
us to elaborate in detail all the ramifications of this „socialist“
devlopment
plan, also not the expansion of its economic base. In the next section,
we
will refer to essential economic developments of this period, insofar
as
they effect further developments, and inasmuch, is retrospect, they
have
relevance to our central theme. 130)
In the midst of its
celebrated
endeavours to realise its Development Plan the PNC regime called for
general
elections in 1973, thereafter, in 1974, it proclaimed a positive
budget;
and, at last, it enunciated its Declaration of Sophia, on December 14,
1974.
Needless to state, the 1973 general elections were again irregular and
the
ruling PNC Party won with an absolute majority. 131)
At its First Biennial Congress, August 18‑25, 1975, which was held
under the theme „Towards the Socialist Revolution“, the practical part
of this „socialist“ declaration was delineated in more detail. 132)
Unintentionally, but nevertheless, correctly, the PNC called its world
outlook and theoretical apparatus an „ideology“.
All ideologies of ruling classes, which by definition suppress other
social
classes, have essential elements of rationalising and camouflaging
dominant
ruling class social violence. They are in sharp contradistinction to
revolutionary
theory‑praxis, which is concrete expression of historical truth, which
has
nothing to conceal. 133)
However, in the welcoming
address to the 1975 Conference, the PNC Party Chairman emphasised: „I
share
the thinking of Marx and Engels in their early work, „The Holy
Family’.“
134)
He quoted a famous passage concerning „history“ in the above‑mentioned
book, but, what the „Comrade Chairman“,
with his impervious „comrade philosophy“ failed to excogitate, was that
as
early as the late 1840s, the fathers of scientific socialism
principally
execrated all political genres of personality cults and any personation
or
impersonation of scientific socialism. Quoting an article of „Our
Leader“ (Burnham) written in Thunder back in 1955, he attempted to
portray the „Comrade Prime Minister“ as the living ensemble of Guyanese
„socialism“. 135)
The PNC was
consecrated
to a „paramount vanguard socialist party“ and the „Declaration of
Sophia“
was divulged as its „socialist charters“. 136)
Again, by quoting a speech, given by Marx on September 15, 1872, at the
Hague Congress of the International the „Comrade Chairman“ made
emphatic the historic objective of the Guyanese worker: „One day the
working man must seize political power so as to construct the new
organisation of labour. We must overthrow the old political system
which supports the old institutions“. (Marx) 137)
This is an excellent ensample
of how „leftist“ ruling class ideology deliberately manipulates
scientific
socialist theory, to fall in line with the requirements of its
oppressive
objectives. If the „working men“ of Guyana had taken on his challenge,
by
now they could have seized PNC „political power“, and would have
overthrown
all the „State co‑operatives“ and „old institutions“ inherited from
British
colonialism.
In the context of his
declaration,
with a bad grace, the „Comrade Leader“, Burnham, equated „socialist
revolution“
with „war“: „For a revolution is just like a war. .... I believe that
every
country must get used to waging its battles in whatever condition it
finds
itself in“. 138)
But, in his own interest,
he declared that the Guyanese socialist revolution „will be peaceful
and
without violence and bloodshed“. 139)
The utilisation of the verb
„ to believe“ by a „socialist“, was by no means a Freudian slip of the
tongue. Burnham is a staunch believer, a „Marxist and a Christian”, and
not a lover
of science. In the same year, Guynews confirmed that „more than 3,000
dedicated followers of the PNC and Prime Minister Forbes Burnham“ were
spreading „the gospel of socialism“ among the working people of Guyana.
140)
Very obviously, the
Declaration
of Sophia refrained from making trenchant remarks about the real
essence
of PNC ideology. Very tactfully, Burnham evaded the issue: „you will
have
noted that the first ariticle of the draft Constitution declares that
the
‘Party is a Socialist Party’. That connotes or means that the Party’s
ideology
is Socialism. ... I do not propose to go into an in‑depth treatment of
the
subject.“ 141)
Other PNC publications, to which he referred, also do not reveal any
„in‑depth treatment“, any philosophic
comprehension or even any conscientious study of scientific socialism. 142)
Furthermore, Burnham used
the concepts „peace“ and „violence“ in their general, ideological
connotations,
which express everything and nothing. The negation of „class violence“
is
not „world peace“, it is world‑historic emacipation. 143)
In content, very
vaguely,
the Declaration treated topics, such as the „restructuring and role of
the
socialist party“, the „social use of land“, „foreign trade and private
investments“,
„ownership and mobilisation of national resources“ and „cooperatives“. 144)
It exhibited Guyanese „socialism“
as being comented firmly in the „co‑operative, state and private
enterprise
sectors“ of the economy. Let us just spotlight the „co‑operative“
sector.
The „small man“ and
his
„co‑operative“, the dispossessed and exploited pariahs and helots of
Guyanese
society, who possessed neither capital nor means of production, but
only
labour power to exploit, were advanced as the human dynamos of
„co‑operative
socialism“. They had to produce „socialism“ or perish! 145)
The „co‑operative“ was glorified
as their „instrument of liberation“. 146)
In fact, Guyanese by nature
are „co‑operative“: „Thousands of cooperatives have been formed over
the
last ten years, and they dot the countryside“. 147),
In his declaration, Burnham
did not supply any detailed information about this co-operative panacea
to
all the social evils of Guyana. He merely pinpointed its „weaknesses“.
There
were not enough organisers, not sufficient credits available, and,
unfortunately,
some of these „organisers“ have anticipated his own plans, they have
changed
the „co‑operatives“ into „private share‑holding companies“. For this
reason,
the Kuru-Kuru Co‑op College and other institutions have been
established
„to provide the correct attitudes“ and to train managers. 148)
In December, 1974,
Hamilton
Green, the then Minister of Co‑operatives and National Mobilisation, in
an
article titled „Self‑Help and Co‑operatives“, supplied more background
information
about co‑operativism in Guyana. He dated the „spirit of co-operativism“
back
to yesteryear, to „Cuffy and his group of freedom‑fighters in 1763“. 149)
However, in his essay, Green could not come to any conclusive opinion,
whether he was searching for „socialism“
in Guyanese history, in „primi co-operativism“, which was an intrinsic,
natural
feature of all ancient societies or whether he was considering
„co-operativism“
to be a scientific instrument to used for socialist transformation of
capitalist
society. He ended up, by stating such platitudes as „History,
therefore,
suggests a continuation of the cooperative principle which worked so
well
for the survival and well‑being of our forefathers“. 150)
He elevated „co‑operativism“ to a „philosophy”, to the „love for
wisdom”.
What Green and the PNC
understand
by „cooperatives“, is at best illustrated, when we outline the
stereotypes
which he mentioned in his article. In 1974, there were 315 school
co‑operative
societies with a membership of over 40,000, and savings of over G$
300,000.
Then, there were fishermen’s, cane farming, pig rearers’ co‑operatives,
including
the Guyana Co‑operative Wholesale Society. In fact, any colonial‑ or
neocolonial
‑ capitalist organised economic activity was miraculously transformed
into
a „co‑operative“ institution. If „co‑operatives“ did not exist, they
had
to be invented. Already in 1972, Guynews supplied an encyclopaedic
compendium
of types of co‑operatives: the „most successful“ and „dynamic“ ones
were
located in the areas of „housing, the hinterland, tourism,
live‑stock‑cattle,
poultry and pig, ... retailing and distributing consumer goods,
providing
a source of credit, fishing and providing catering services, ...
producing
claybricks, operating bookshops in schools, manufacturing garments,
footwear,
leather handbags, suitcases and headwear, ... operating petrol and
service
stations and bakeries“. 151)
Certainly, all these areas provide a fertile ground to organise
scientifically‑planned co‑operatives, but, then, „co‑operativism“ must
begin principally in the PNC Government and
its institutions.
Even multinationals
like
Reynolds (Guyana) Mines Ltd. followed suit to nurture PNC
„co‑operativism“.
It assisted the Rice Farmers Co‑operative Society to cultivate its
72‑acre
farm. 152)
Cammie Ramsaroop, the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, also had to
intervene to explain that „co‑operativism is the vehicles for economic
and social change“. 153)
Finally, on February 22, 1976,
when the beginning of the end was already in process, Burnham himself
appeared
on the „co‑opevative“ platform and stated: „There is no place to
indulge
in a long catalogue, but be he friend or foe, any observer, unless he
is
purblind, must perforce concede that we have continued to move forward.
We
have not reached the peak of Olympus, nor the top of the pyramid, but
we
have neither stood still nor moved backward“. 154)
He forgot to change the pluralis
majestatis „we“ to PNC. Notwithstanding, in September, 1976, the PPP
reported
that many co‑operatives had collapsed, and it gave various examples. 155)
Four years later, Brindley Benn’s Vanguard will classify
„cooperativism“ as a „fool’s paradise“ and
will concede that the only really functioning co‑operative was
Jonestown.
156)
By 1984, as a result of total economic bankruptcy 157),
the whole cooperative system will exist only in name, but not as a
functioning economic reality. In any case, as long as PNC „co‑operative
capitalism“ survives, in its understanding
of „co-operatives“, any forced slavery will be titled as such.
As already stated,
Guyana’s foreign policy, from 1966 to 1975, was mainly dictated by the
future Secretary-General
of the British Commonwealth, „Sonny“ Ramphal. 158)
Essentially, his successors, Fred R. Wills (1975-1978) and Rasleigh
Jackson, will continue the basic tenets of his foreign policy,
developed during the period, 1970-1975. 159)
The essence of this policy, Wills later summarised as follows: „foreign
policy is a reflection of national policy and is the tool employed in
the field of international relations for achieving national
objectives“. 160)
This is precisely what we
have demonstrated until now. He should just have added: a „tool“ for
achieving
‘PNC’ national ‘colonial-capitalist’ objectives“.
During this period, in
order
to give „co-operative socialism“ a „Third World“, „anticolonialist“,
„socialist“
and „non- aligned“ external image, the PNC regime had to extend its
diplomatic,
cultural and economic relations to the respective world spheres. With
regard
to Soviet and Chinese diplomatic relations, in spite of the Sino-Soviet
conflict,
Burnham, an expert in vacillating, opportunistic policies, played his
role
exceedingly well. 161)
A Soviet team, led by Aleksei
V. Zwiagin, was invited „to look into our economy“. 162)
In 1973, diplomatic and trade relations were established with Cuba and
weekly air services organised. 163)
On April 2, 1973, the Chinese ambassador, Wang Chan Yuan, presented his
credentials to Guyanese President Arthur Chung. 164)
By 1974, the PNC regime was ready to move towards the
USA-EEC-Japan-China axis. By July, 1974, imports
from China already valued G$ 6.1 million and exports to China reached
G$
16.4 million. 165)
Until 1976, this tendency towards
„socialist“ economic relations will continue, but since 1977, Guyana
again
re-established firm relations with the World Bank/IMF capitalist chain.
World
„imperialism“ had no reasons to get excited ever Burnham’s
„co-operative socialist“
salto mortale in foreign policy, of the 1974-1977 period. Other
significant
elements of Guyanese foreign policy during this period were the
attempts
to cultivate Caribbean Unity and Integration, to establish relations
with
Latin America, and to extend trade and cultural relations with
Venezuela, Brazil and Surinam. 166)
Ever since 1976,
having secured
political, military and economic power, the PNC regime could begin with
the
pillaging and plundering of Guyana’s human and natural resources. In
Part III, on the economic plane, we will elaborate further
„nationalizations“
and their aftermath, the establishment of Government State
Corporations,
the Third Development Plan (1978-1981), the Upper Mazaruni
Hydro-Electric
Project (UMHEP) and the IMF Agreements. On the political level, we will
demonstrate
the road to open military dictatorship, the 1978 Referendum, the 1980
general
elections and the inauguration of the Second Republic (1980). Within
the
context of the mounting emancipatory movement, we will elucidate the
emergence
of the WPA, the unleashing of political repression, murders and
assassinations,
the Jonestown holocaust and the blatant violations of basic human
rights.
We will terminate with a review of Guyana’s evolving foreign policy, by
making
special reference to the Venezuela/Guyana border conflict. All the
abovementioned
processes and selected events form the essential core of the inexorable
decline,
of the inevitable involution, of Guyanese „co-operative socialism“. We
will
also investigate whether contemporary Guyana is pregnant with new
neo-colonial disasters, or, whether within the decomposition of archaic
social processes, aurorean, aeonian revolutionary light can
interpenetrate and invigorate future emancipatory social
transformations.
Part Three
The
Decline
of „Co-Operative Socialism“, 1976-1984
For the sake of
scientific clarity, let us make intelligible what we understand by
involutionary and evolutionary processes in history and in Guyana.
Contrary to the general, erroneous, ideological approach of juxtaposing
„revolution” and „evolution“
in such a manner that they have no dialectical relation, we consider
both
concepts to be expressing two interrelated „phases” of one and the same
flowing, universal or particular process. „Co-operative Socialism“ in
Guyana is a particular,
historical process which came into existence (by evolution) and which
necessarily
must pass away (by involution). In the same way, as „revolution“ and
„evolution“
are interrelated, „revolution“ and „involution“ have reciprocal
relations.
Consequently, „involution“ and „evolution“ are universal categories,
expressing
multifarious modes and multiveloce motions of cosmic change.
Within human history,
which is a specific process of essentially organic-production, general
transformations,
that is, radical, qualitative, social changes, can be represented
exactly
as social revolutions. Conversely, formal, mechanical or quantitative
alterations,
which do not change fundamentally the social essence of the status quo
or
establishment, are scientificallly characterised as social reforms.
Inter
alia, they include such political phenomena as „de-colonisation“,
„palace
revolutions“ and a coup d’etat. In the case of Guyana,
„self-government“,
„flag“ independence and „self-reliance“, all, fall in this category.
Furthermore,
Burnham’s „co-operative socialism“, Ken Danes „silent revolution“ and
the
PNC’s „socialist revolution“ are all horses of the same colour, which
do
not merit any further flogging. 167)
Ex post facto, we have brought
out striking examples of simple quantitative and qualitative changes within Guyanese history, 1930-1975. We
have given
testimony of some polymorphic British colonial social reforms. Very
plainly,
we have demonstrated that the Guyanese peoples, past and present, have
not
experienced a single, autogenous social revolution. The subjugation of
the
autochthonous Amerindian peoples, the introduction of chattel-slavery,
the
abolition of slavery, the substitution of wage-labour, the
establishment
of a colonial-capitalist monetised economy, the granting of
„self-government“
and „independence“ and the ventrous launching of PNC „co-operative
socialism“,
all these, form part of a single, historic, evolutionary,
capitalist-imperialist
process, which was systematically introduced into Guyana. In fact,
„co-operative
socialism“, to use a more appropriate term, Guyanese co-operative
capitalism,
is currently the „highest stage“ of this exploitative imperialist
process
in Guyana. 168)
As such, it is a subordinate, subjunctive, particular historical
product of the general acclivity-declivity of the contemporary
capitalist mode of production. Consequently, from 1499 until today,
Guyanese history, including all its essential, socio-economic multiplex
processes, was generated, directed and controlled exterritorially.
Without minimising
capitalism’s
potentiality to regenerate, and also without underestimating its
imperialist-exploitative
capacities, we can safely say, that with monopolism, it had reached its
zenith,
and gradually it is embarking on its unyielding, protractive,
involutionary,
decompository process. Guyanese co-operative capitalism - a special
form
of neo-colonialism - is intimately linked to the universal-historical
negation
of the central contradiction of our contemporary mode of production,
that
is, to foreign capital. This is the scientific reason why necessarily
it
must follow the declinant path of world capitalism, and why it will
lead
to its inexorable Hegelian „doom“. This is not a matter of belief or
faith,
but of scientific knowledge - a simple, concrete, relative truth of
universal
and historical materialist dialectics.
The various British
and Dutch
colonial administrations, the PPP governments, the British colonial
interim
government, the PNC-UF coalition and the ruling PNC neocolonial regime,
by
hook or by crook, all were either instructed or forced to play
abhorrent roles
of loyal, intermediate executive officers of foreign world-capitalist
(including
„socialist“ and „communist“) interests. 169)
As a process of human production,
Guyanese history must have a central, material contradiction. Global
colonial
and neo-colonial capitalism must have reproduced its own recalcitrant
labour
negation in Guyana, at least as a material delitescence. Wherever
social
resistance to political oppression and economic exploitation was
located
in Guyana, precisely there ubiquitous, teleological latencies were
generated
and progressively they were transformed, by class struggles, into
emancipatory
tendencies. The social transformation of potency and potentiality into
latency,
and further into tendency, is what we understand by human
theory-praxis.
This is also what we meant earlier, when we referred to creation of
material
and intellectual conditions to transform human emancipatory
aspirations,
through social, associated labour, into historic realities.
From this perspective
of social theory and action, not everything is possible, also, whatever
will
be, will not necessarily be in Guyana. Because of the indeterminate,
indeterministic
historic future of Guyana, only such phenomena which have the necessary
material
conditions to evolve, can truly become. Conversely, only if Guyanese
cooperative
capitalism has the necessary conditions to involve, then it can be
wrapped
up historically as productive garbage. 170)
Consequently, the victory
of the liberation forces over Guyanese neo-colonialism is not
inevitable,
is not an absolute truth. It is related historically to the general
human
emancipatory process, which may lead to everything or nothing, which
may
succeed or fail. At least, until now, everything is not lost as yet,
therefore,
Guyanese emancipation from PNC wage-slavery still remains a real,
material
possibility.
In this part, we will
demonstrate
that Guyanese co-operative capitalism is not declining in a
mechanistic,
deterministic, vulgar-materialistic fashion, but, it is currently
decaying,
because an affirmative, emancipatory synthesis is being produced, which
makes
its substance progressively non-essential. That Burnham’s regime is
actually
declining, is the scientific verification of the fact that
revolutionary
forces are attacking the reactionary core of his military dictatorship.
The
emergence of the WPA and its courageous, ephemeral challenge of the
late
1970s demonstrate to what level subterranean political latencies have
already
been transformed into supersubstantial social tendencies and
possibilities.
Guyanese history does
not unfold in a unilinear or uniplanar fashion, exactly because of the
effect
of polyhistoric and multiversal processes mentioned before. While human
history, within the context of tremendous sacrifice of human lives, and
within the framework of a permanent pregnancy with apocalyptic nuclear
perils, slowly
is surpassing its involutionary „phase“, and is transcending towards
resolving
its major contradiction, Burnham’s „co-operative socialism“ rapidly
travels
in reverse-gear, and is currently „moulding“ the suicidal „destiny“ of
its elitist, bureaucratic social class, of which the Jonestown
„co-operative“
was a warning „mene tekel“ on its militarist wall. We will now briefly
summarise
the historical evolution of this ruling, possessing class, its conquest
of
State power, its clinging on to decaying economic power, its
inauspicious
Third Development Plan, and its secretive IMF agreements.
As had been the case
until now, we will limit ourselves to essential factors and relevant
phenomena,
which further our scientific investigation and verification. We will
notice
that Burnham’s co-operative capitalism has a definite, dependent
fixation
to market relations, which determine its economic essence. Towards the
end
of the 19th Century, ushering in its involutionary „phase“, liberal
capitalism qualitatively changed into monopoly capitalism, but without
altering its essential
nature. In Great Britain, various estates were changed into mercantile
houses,
into the forerunners of the contemporary multi-, transnational
corporations.
Bookers Bros. McConnell & Co. Ltd. established itself in British
Guiana
and it depended on market relations and functions for colonial social
exploitation.
Later, PNC cooperative capitalism, including its „cooperatives“ and
state
corporations, will inherit a similar fixation to market relations,
price
policies and economic development plane.
By 1950, British
Guiana
had experienced the consolidation of such colonial-capitalist
relations.
Continuatively, it began to suffer their concomitant social evils:
monocultural
and monoproductive patterns, a vulnerable trisectoral economy, adverse
medical
and health conditions, a rising analphabetic rate, progressive
unemployment
and under-employment, inhuman housing and inhumane living conditions,
chronic poverty and social misery, escalating social „racial”
discrimination and alientated
disindividualisation. 171)
These social conditions gradually
smelted together various lower working social groups of British Guiana
-
in spite of rampant, rabid „racism“ - and formed a compound working
class-in-itself.
However, as stated explicitly before, although they gained popular
support,
the emerging labour, nationalist and antiimperialist movements did not
accomplish
any essential qualitative social changes. On the contrary, the flowing,
productive
base, plantation-slavery, indenture and peripheral capitalism, very
clearly
reflected the reformist, constitutional changes in the political
movements
of the Guianese superstructure. 172)
By then, middle class
professionals
(mainly Afro-Guianese) and small businessmen and traders (mainly
Madeiran-Portuguese
and Chinese) had already transformed themselves into national political
elites.
Consequently, they were able to exercise a considerable control over
domestic
State revenues. It was the social dynamics of this national middle
class
which had generated the political thrust towards nationalism and
„independence“.
On the other hand, on a parallel plane, progressively, Indo-Guianese
nationalism
and national capitalistic interests were gaining social momentum
especially
due to popular workers’ support in the rice and sugar industries. The
Jagan-Burnham
PPP was a political reflection of the strength of Indo-Guianese -
Afro-Guianese
national economic class interests, which were directed against the
British
colonial planter-class. Already before, British colonialism was aware
of
this economic danger to its colonial-capitalist interests. This is the
reason
why the colonial Georgetown administration had favoured the
Portuguese-Chinese
social drive to become a national petitbourgeois class. It was planned
to
become a formidable economic „sea-wall,“ to break the stormy Indo- and
Afro-Guianese
waves of capitalist-economic onslaught.
However, carried on
the crest
of the trade union movement, Indo-Guianese economic development made
remarkable
strides forward. Consequently, the British Government considered it
apposite
to amalgamate D’Aguiar’s „national capitalism“ with Burnham’s
„socialism“,
in order to stop Jagan’s „communism“. This political checkmate against
Jagan
was reflected in the formation of the PNC-UF coalition government, in
the
granting of „self-government“ to Guyana and in the realisation of PNC
„flag“
independence. It resulted in a new game with new contradictions. The
new
national elite, spearheaded by the PNC, began to accumulate capital
against
British and foreign capitalist interests. Burnham held the longer end
of
the rope, he got rid of D’Aguiar, gained full Statecontrol,
„nationalised“
foreign companies, introduced „co-operativism“, founded State
corporations
and organised selfprotection, by escalating militarism. Thus, the PNC
consolidated
itself as a national, elitist, bureaucratic class and blocked further
Indo-Guianese,
Portuguese and Chinese capital accumulation. The inauguration of the
Cooperative
Republic (1970) and the Declaration of Sophia (1974) marked the PNC’s
final
victory over all other class interests.
The economic-
paradoxical aporia of all these, was that the PNC expected „world
imperialism“ to supply the necessary funds, credits, loans and gifts to
feed its parasitic class.
This generosity was expected as a sort of natural „compensation“ for
its
tested loyalty, after its political dethronement of Jagan and its
historical
betrayal of Guyanese working class interests. As we will see, for a
while,
its dreams materialised. The IMF patiently endured PNC infantile
economic
pranks of the 1978-1983 period. But, by 1984, this PNC „fairy
god-mother“
had enough of its opportunism and
farce.
At no at stage in its
political
history, the PNC ever had dreamt about realising Socialism, at least
not
what is understood scientifically by this term. Ever since 1970, it
began to introduce strategic measures to deploy State capital to class
accumulation. It elevated itself to a new ruling and possessing class.
Mercilessly, it
began to extract surplus value from the impoverished Guyanese working
population.
A large part of this social surplus was directed towards military
build-up,
to internal PNC self-protection and to strategies to nurture „border
conflicts“. Without the latter, Burnham would not sleep sound, and
world imperialism
would lose an important geopolitical tool for „destabilization“ in that
part
of the Caribbean region. 173)
Finally, let us make
some general remarks about Guyana’s growing working class-in-itself,
and its growth towards a politically conscious working
class-for-itself, towards a proletariat.
174)
Guyana’s future proletariat
had its genesis in the epoch of the plantation economy. Already then,
part-time peasants, mainly dependent on wage-labour, had evolved. 175)
In the interior, in agricultural
production, but also in the mining industry, the manual labourers in
the
villages more and more acquired this dual labour character. Towards the
middle
of the 20th Century, progressively, all rural labourers were converted
into
wage or semi-wage workers. By 1975, even in agriculture - in the rice
and
sugar industries - pure peasant families had already disappeared. At
that
time, the total active labour force amounted to 200,000 (out of a total
population
of approximately 700,000) 176),
of which about half was employed
by the PNC State. 177)
In the rural region, where
about 10% of the population was concentrated, the agricultural workers
produced
under typical colonial and neo-colonial capitalist relations, which
were
nurtured by a special oppressive landlordism. However, a Guyanese
peasantry and a wealthy landlord class never developed.
Ever since the
beginning
of the century, along the narrow Coastal Belt, where the majority of
the population
lives, especially in the bauxite mining areas, a large urban workforce
had
been formed. 178)
It was this „multi-racial“ pauperised workforce, inspired by Rodney’s
WPA, that began to stir around
1980. Together with its concomitant indo-Guyanese rural labour wing, it
is responsible for Burnham’s „co-operative socialist“ nightmare.
As we have noted, the
FCH Development Plan, although „rolled over“ to 1977, was a complete
economic fiasco. To accumulate PNC State capital, a new development
programme was
projected for 1978-1981, and economic growth was targeted for 17% in
real
terms. This occurred in a financial situation where, between 1965 and
1976,
the respective Guyanese governments had already spent G$ 987.6 million
more
than the Treasury received. 179)
Rocked by the adversities
of a neo-colonial capitalist economy, Guyana was experiencing mounting
social
and economic crises, had budget and balance of payments deficits, had
to
make cuts in essential imports, in development (capital) expenditure
and
in social services, had to reduce subsidies on essential commodities
and
services, and, had to redeploy and dismiss numerous workers. 180)
A large part of the social
surplus value, which was produced under severe social conditions, was
squandered
to enrich the PNC elite and to finance their Cadillac style of living.
Between
1975 and 1981, a World Bank Report on Guyana of 1982 illustrated the
poor
economic performance as follows: „by 1981 the real level of per capita
income
was lower than it had been in 1970 and nearly 30% below the level
reached
in 1975“. 181)
In the first half of the 1970s,
the economy relatively grew rapidly, thereafter, a progressive
stagnation
and decay set in. 182)
At the peak of „co-operative socialism“, GDP (at factor cost) increased
by nearly 4.0% p. a. Between 1975 and 1980, as a result of world
depressive factors and PNC mismanagement and pillage, it fell to -0.7%
p. a. 183)
Between 1974 and 1975,
oil prices quadrupled, but the economy was saved by the sugar price
boom. Furthermore,
Guyana’s average export prices, due to special arrangements, were
significantly
higher than world marked prices. 184)
The Terms of Trade Index (1977
= 100) were as follows: 1970 - 90.0; 1975 - 129.1;
1976
- 101.0; 1977 - 100; 1978 - 93.2; 1979 - 85.2; 1980 - 91.3; 1981 - 84.1
185)
However, sugar production
alone could not save the economy from progressive declination. In
addition,
1975-1980 had witnessed a sharp drop in bauxite production and output
of
other economic sectors. We will not elaborate the Third Development
Plan
in all its formal ramifications. Relevant is, to cognosce its financial
backing
by the IMF/World Bank complex. Later we will refer to the
hydro-electric
project, which was an important constituent part of this development
plan.
As stated before, the
Third Development Plan was based on economic aid from the PNC „fairy
god-mother“,
the IMF, and from her associated international foreign capital
institutions.
After ALCAN was „nationalised“, and the UF was thrown out of
government,
such benevolent measures were reduced to a calculated minimum. For
example,
in 1971, the World Bank had refused a Guyana loan application of US$
5.4
million for drainage and irrigation. However, in June 1977, Terence
Todman,
thenformer US Assistant Secretary of State, became convinced that
„Guyana
is seeking a different path of social and economic development, one
with
which we have no quarrel and which we have no reason to fear“. 186)
This simply means that the
United States then knew for certain in which direction the PNC
„co-operative
socialist“ gale was blowing.
Thus, on June 12,
1978,
the PNC Government could come to a secret agreement with the IMF.
Paradoxically, IMF „conditionality“ began to contradict the PNC
antisocialist economic objectives,
as expressed in its development plan. The Washington Post revealed the
true
motives of this IMF decision to make a loan available to Guyana. It was
a
political chess move „of potentially major significance in US efforts
to check
the spread of leftist influence in the Caribbean“. 187)
To qualify for the IMF loans, Guyana’s development plans had to secure,
inter alia, the following: a real growth in GDP of 5% from 1978-1981; a
reduction of the current account deficit to 10% of GDP (from about 32%)
to an increase in foreign assets; and, a reduction
in foreign payment arrears. 188).
A G$ 27. 3 million credit
(in compensating financing) was negotiated.
For 1979,
an Extended Fund Facility for G$ 204 million was agreed upon.
At what point did PNC
and IMF capitalist objectives synchronise? What did the PNC-IMF
agreementa have
in stock for the Guyanese workers? Inter alia, the IMF loans resulted
in:
removal of subsidies, increased prices on consumer goods, increased
costs
of electricity, telephones and transportation, an increase of bank
rates, restrictions on imports, food shortages, dismissals and
retrenchment of workers.
189)
In August 1979, the IMF „Stand-by
Agreement“ was prolonged by an „Extended Arrangement“ for a further
revised
credit of G$ 206.4 million, in addition to the G$ 48 million already
granted
in 1978. 190)
At the end of 1979, the Development
Plan failed to meet the IMF guide-lines, and in July, 1980, a new deal
had
to be worked out. Under the new agreement, credits were provided up to
an
equivalent of SDR’s 100 million (US$ 132. 1 million). The new deal
extended over the period July 1, 1980 - July 1, 1983. During the period
1980-1981, Guyana drew US$ 47.1 million. Generously, in 1981-1982, the
IMF again increased the total amount of the arrangement from SDR’s 100
million to 150 million
(US$ 172 million). The PNC gladly grasped this life-line, but it did
not
realise that it was a rope for economic execution. Together with these
extended arrangements, new „conditionalities“ were drawn up, and new
targets were
set. 191)
Obviously, none of them could be realised. Finally, in 1983, the IMF
refused any further economic aid to Guyana for the 1984-1985 period. 192)
Thus ended an economic process,
which begun with the introduction of the Puerto Rican economic model,
way
back in 1966. What it intended to avoid, now will appear on the
Guyanese
social scene.
The PNC Third
Development Plan and the IMF Agreements, on the economic level, express
the two counterparts
of the PNC „co-operative socialist“ - world imperialist contradiction.
The
accumulation of PNC State capital did not agree with the IMF/ World
Bank
plans to convert Guyana into a typical modern neo-colony. Burnham did
not
want the IMF to dictate political terms to him, but he agreed that it
should
pay Guyana’s debts, clear its bills for development,
keep
some of its creditors at bay and to finance its consumption and
remuneration.
193)
By December 1979, Guyana’s
foreign debt had increased to G$ 2.5 billion as compared to the 1980
budget
of G$ 1,086 billion. 194)
Debt charges increased from
G$ 10.3 million in 1964, to G$ 236 million in 1980. In 1979, 38% of the
current
expenditure, or 56.8% of current revenue, or 30.5% of export earnings,
went
towards debt and compensation payments and charges. 195)
It simply means that world imperialism was holding the right end of the
stick, and Burnham was left
with the rotting carrot.
The Third Development
Plan broke down completely and, at the end of 1981, displayed the
following statistical
data: economic growth -0.5%; current account deficit G$ 274 million;
current
account of balance of payments G$ 558 million; and social services
allocations
fell from 45.9% in 1964 to 30.9%. 196)
Consequently, in the 1982
budget, debt charges and repayments rose to G$ 462.7 million, that is,
76.6%
of current reserves, or 41% of export earnings, or 51.8% of current
expenditure.
197)
This economic decline, on
the political level, generated political bankruptcy, accelerated
militarism,
escalated „racism“, invigorated „border dispute“ aggression and
vindicated
neo-fascist dictatorship.
In the mid-1970s, a
significant
economic element of the Third Development Plan, and of PNC-planned
State
capital accumulation, was the launching of the Upper Mazaruni
Hydro-Electric
Project (UMHEP) in the Essequibo region. To introduce this project, an
international
seminar on „Hydropower and Environment“ was held in Georgetown between
October
4 and 8, 1976. 198)
The main objectives of this
UMHEP, certainly, were not „to meet the country’s electrical needs for
a
period of eight to ten years ahead“ (Dennis Irvine) 199)
or to sell electricity to Venezuela,
Brazil or Suriname. Inter alia, Burnham’s „King Bruce“ or „spider“
project
was a capitalist „utopian dream“ to establish „an Aluminium Smelter of
approximately
148,000 tonnes per year capacity“ 200),
to construct a new town,
in the complex of some 200 square miles, to convert the region into a
tourist
attraction, and, last but not least, to reduce his oil import bill. 201)
The latter consumed already
36% of the total value of imports in 1980 and absorbed 35% of the total
export earnings. 202)
This expenditure surely did
not favour rapid State capital accumulation. Furthermore, this project
was
an excellent strategy to aggravate the border conflict with Venezuela,
in anticipation of the termination of the Protocol of Port-of-Spain in
1982.
And, who will have to
finance
this mammoth US$ 2 billion (currently about G$ 6 billion) project,
whose
costs, by a half, Guyana’s foreign debt of the mid-1980s would
approximate,
and which itself would constitute the sextuple of Guyana’s 1982 budget?
203)
The answer to this question does not merit any quiz prize. As usual, it
will have to be the same capital sources and resources which have
financed all Guyana’s development plans.
And, how would Venezuela take this obvious tantalising move? In spite
of
the „border dispute“, on November 20, 1978, Carlos Andres Perez, the
then
President of Venezuela, stated in Georgetown: „Venezuela has decided to
study
the possibility of linking the present and future systems of the two
countries
and purchasing electricity from Guyana on the completion of the
hydro-power project. .... We will give all we can to help develop this
complex“. 204)
The truth of the matter is
that if Burnham’s PNC had studied introductory commercial arithmetic,
it
would never have formulated such a gigantic project. Guyana was not
even
capable of completing another mini-hydro-electric project at
Tumatumari,
which was costing only G$ 200 million. 204) As we know already, Guyana
failed
to realise IMF targets, and, consequently, no „full blessings“ were
given
by the World Bank to the UMHEP Programme. 205)
In addition, while terminating the Protocol of Port-of-Spain, President
Herrera Campins reiterated „Venezuela’s rejection of the Hydro-Electric
Project of the Upper Mazaruni“. 206)
Like the IMF and the World Bank, even Venezuela grew impatient of
„spoon-feeding“ Burnham with lectures
on contemporary realpolitik and international realities.
To militarise Guyana,
the PNC Government not only needed „border disputes“ with Venezuela and
Suriname
207),
it also required, in addition to hard words, plenty of hard cash. One
method to secure ready money for hardware
and militarization was to organise further „nationalisations“ and to
convert
the „compensated“ companies into State corporations. We have mentioned
earlier
some „nationalisations“ of the 1971-1976 period, here, we will just
turn
the spotlight on Bookers Bros., Reynolds and Jessel Holdings.
After the purchase
agreement
with ALCAN in 1971, the Opposition taunted Burnham that he was afraid
to
touch Reynolds, „lest government incur the wrath of Uncle Sam“. 208)
This is an indication of how superficially the then PNC „Opposition“
had comprehended Burnham’s political „fox and geese“ game. The royal
„fox“ replied to these jibes „that he was operating like a camoudie,
digesting one meal before going after another“.
209)
To make a long story short,
on January 1, 1975, Reynolds was „nationalised“ and it became the
State-owned BERMINE, which completed the purchase agreements in the
bauxite sector. 210)
Next on the list was Jessel Holdings, the smaller sugar company, but,
the „camoudie“ was really yearning for a big bite into the „sugary“
Bookers Empire.
The interests of
Jessel Holdings
included two sugar factories, various sugar-cane cultivations, 63% of
the
shares of Diamond Liquors Ltd. and 20% of the shares of Demerara Sugar
Terminals
Ltd. The purchase agreement of May 26, 1975, contained the following:
„Government
will pay G$ 15 million for the local assets of this British Company. G$
5
million will be paid in cash. G$ 10 million will be paid over a period
of
10 years bearing interest at the rate of 8.5% subject to withholding
tax
of 25%. This means that the real interest rate will be 6.35%. The G$ 10
million
compensation for the two sugar factories, 2,000 acres of sugar cane and
all
buildings and stores will be paid for, from future profits over the
next ten
years“. 211)
The PPP Thunder added up all the costs, and came to a total of G$ 25
million. 212)
The multi-corporation
giant Bookers began cane-sugar exploitation in Guyana as early as 1815.
By 1976, according to a speech of Burnham (of February 22, 1976), it
„was responsible for over 40 per cent of the country’s exports (...)
and over 25 per cent
of the Gross Domestic Product (...) and which in addition, according to
its
own admission, brought no new capital into Guyana over the last ten
years“.
213)
For the Bookers assets, which were estimated at G$ 102.5 million, the
Guyana Government agreed to make
a net payment of approximately G$ 70 million. According to the purchase
agreement, the amount had to be paid over 20 years at an operative rate
of interest
of 41/2% p. a. Attacking the „political morons“ (especially the PPP and
WPA), Burnham concluded, by rejoicing: „I say we have got a good deal“.
214)
He noted further: „Ours must
be the pursuit of perfection. We must aim at the stars, not at the
earthy
mountain tops.“ 215).
This is indicative of Burnham’s
celestial, megalomaniac traits. The whole sugar industry was
reorganised
under the supervision of the State-owned Guyana Sugar Corporation
(GUYSUCO).
There was not much left to „nationalise“ further - only some minor
deals
with Berger Paints and Cable and Wireless followed. 216)
After the PNC victory
over the UF, in 1969, the Guyana State Corporation (GUYSTAC) was
conceived. In
1972, Guynews expressed its main function as follows: It „is now
functionary
head of all public corporations, and as such is now responsible for
employment
at the Corporation“. 217)
Thus, the PNC State was now
not only controlling allmajor „public“ corporations, it was also
„responsible“
for the extraction of surplus-value. Let us just specify some of the
corporations which are under its control: Guyana Rice Board (GRB),
Guyana Airways Corporation
(GAC), Guyana Post Office Corporation (GPOC), Guyana Telecommunications
Corporation
(GTC , Guyana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC), Guyana National
Newspapers
Ltd. (GNL), Guyana Stores Ltd., Guyana Electricity Company (GEC),
Guyana
Marketing Corporation (GMC) and the National Insurance Scheme (NIC).
Before
1970, Bookers, Reynolds, ALCAN, Jessel, Shell Antilles (Guyana) Ltd.
and
other private enterprises had employed the largest amount of workers. 218)
At the time of the Sophia Declaration,
next to GUYBAU and Government-owned banks, GUYSTAC advanced as the
major
public employer. Since 1976, GUYSUCO, GUYMINE and BERMINE absorbed the
employees
of the early multinational companies. By 1979, GUYSTAC became a PNC
national
„Multi“; it controlled 29 „public“ corporations, which had assets
valued
at approximately G$ 500 million. 219)
Until about 1977, most
of these public corporations made some profits. However, squandermania,
mismanagement,
corruption and foreign exchange problems soon took their toll. A year
after
„nationalisation“, GUYSUCO already made a loss of G$ 15.6 million, and
GUYBAU’s
income dropped from G$ 33.3 million in 1977 to G$ 24.1 million in 1979.
220)
The losses of GAC and GEC
for 1979 were G$ 2.0 million and G$ 24.0 million, respectively. 221)
From the very outset, PNC
State capital accumulation was losing the battle against foreign
capital monopolisation.
Very hesitatingly, the
Sophia
Declaration had made room for private enterprise. 222)
In 1979, facing economic decline,
the PNC Government was forced to formulate an „Investment Code“, to
encourage
foreign investments and private enterprises, mainly in the fields of
manufacturing,
agriculture, fishing, food-production and housing. 223)
On the whole, the „King“ of liquor production, D’Aguiar, dominates the
private enterprise sector. His „Banks“, which he regards as a „Symbol
of Prosperity for all Guyana“, is
the only corporation which never comes in the red. It contributes
nearly
G$ 40 million annually to the public purse from taxes of its products. 224)
But, it is also indirectly
the cause for escalation of violence, criminality, „choke and rob“,
immorality, murder and rape.
Between 1970 and 1980,
the PNC converted its „co-operative socialism“ into a concentrated
militarism. Military expenditure rose from G$ 14.8 million (11.1% of
the current expenditures) in 1970, to G$ 103 million (21.5%) in 1980. 225)
In addition, „military and
police personnel have been beefed-up, and sophisticated surveillance
(spying)
equipment valued at G$ 5 million have been brought recently (1980)“. 226)
Between 1980 and 1982, several attempts were made to buy all-purpose
military aircraft of the counter-insurgency
type from Brazil to be used mainly in internal conflict situations. In
1982,
a contract was signed with Brazil to purchase 2 EMB III military
planes,
costing US$ 10 million, which should „patrol the coastal areas“. 227)
Let us scrutinise some of Burnham’s
PNC military organisations. We will also make reference to the
paramilitary
religious cults, the „People’s Temple“ and the „House of Israel.”
The Guyana Defence
Force (GDF) was established in October/November 1965. However, nine
years later,
at the time of the Sophia Declaration, in number, the GDF did not yet
exceed 4,000. Yet, in 1974, G$ 24.7 million was voted for its military
expenditure.
228)
Then total budget for the
same year was G$ 38,064,342, and it comprised 10% of the national
budget.
229)
Towards 1980, although the military figures are „top-secret“, it was
estimated that the GDF numbered
some 20,000 persons, and that G$ 72.7 million was spent on the army.
This
means that the army expenditure had tripled within 6 years. Currently,
the
total strength of the GDF itself can be estimated at about 30,000. We
will
elaborate its associated military wings later.
On three occasions,
Guyana’s
GDF had encountered actual combat: during the 1968/1969 Rupununi
„insurrection“;
in 1969, when it captured some Surinamese who had invaded the New River
Area;
and, in 1970, when the Venezuelan Army had occupied Ankoko Island. In
reality,
the GDF was never engaged in serious battles against foreign invaders.
Its
military action was mainly directed towards suppressing internal
political
and labour resistance. 230)
In the late 1970s, when the
WPA was challenging the Burnham regime, „millions of dollars of field
artillery
and ammunition arrived in Guyana on Saturday, March 10, 1979“. 231)
The cargo had arrived aboard the MACITAT, at the eve of the so-called
„survival budget“ of 1979. In the slaying of the popular WPA-leader,
Dr. Walter Rodney, it seems that the GDF
had played a significant role in the operations. 232)
The Guyana People’s
Militia (GPM) was set up on December 1, 1976; it had the expressed
objective of making „Every Citizen a Soldier“. This should really read
„every PNC member a soldier“.
By 1977, the GPM numbered 10,000, and essentially it had an
Afro-Guyanese
composition - which is the general rule throughout Burnham’s military
machine.
233)
Among other suppressive functions,
it assists „the GDP in all its internal and external functions“. It is
a
reservoir for GDP recruits and a first class reserve for the GDP. 234)
Officially, the GPM is defined as „a military body of citizens, trained
in military skills, imbued with
a high sense of loyalty and dedicated to the nation and its programme
for
socialist development“. 235)
In 1979, Guyana In Brief elaborated
its social functions: „Emphasis will be placed on civil defence work
such
as first aid, rescue operation and fire fighting“. 236)
Needless to say, precisely
such activities did not appear as the main social priorities of the
GPM.
Together with the GDF, the GPM forms the military organisational core
of
Burnham’s political dictatorship. Thus, Guyana has an estimated number
of
some 50,000 trained and armed forces in 1984. This figure excludes the
paramilitary
troops with which we will deal later.
Even „racism“ was
introduced
into military matters. According to top PNC officials, Guyana has
„better-brand“
citizens, those Afro-Guyanese in the military organisations, and
citizens
of „inferior quality“, mainly the Indo-Guyanese, who refuse to join
such
repressive military organs. New Nation, the PNC Party-organ,
emphasised: „Militia
will produce better brand of citizens“. 237)
In a statement, made by Hamilton
Green, we can read expressis verbis: „the Guyana People’s Militia, even
when
not called upon to go into action, will be an agency through which a
better
brand of citizens are produced“. 238)
This military race of „better brand“ people has „to swear loyalty to
the PNC Government“; in reality, they constitute a PNC Militia Party. 239)
In July, 1974, Guynews
reported
that „all arrangements have been completed for the launching of the
National
Service“. 240)
At that time, it was directed by the current head of the GDF, Brigadier
Norman McLean. Among its tasks
was the provision of „training for national defence“. 241)
The expenditure on GNS rose
from G$ 6.5 million in 1974 to G$ 20 million in 1980. 242)
In 1979, the true face of
the GNS was unmasked when the GDP, GNS and the Guyana Police Force
(GPF)
suppressed the Indo-Guyanese, sugar strikes. Their combined members
acted
as „scabs“ to maintain „law and order“. 243)
By 1982, the GNS, which then had some 10,000 members, progressively was
degenerating into a quasi-military, rigidly authoritarian organisation.
Contradictions evolved
within
the military structure, especially as a result of the rising popularity
of
Hamilton Green within the PNC. Thus, Burnham, as Minister of Defense,
permanently
has to create new military organisations to act as „national guards“.
In
1979, another paramilitary wing of the armed forces came into
existence:
the National Guard Service (NGS). It is headed by a Senior State
Security
Officer, Laurie Lewis. The Catholic Standard classified the NGS within
the
category of the CIA, KGB and MI5. 244)
In reality, the NGS forms
part of the whole military, espionage and assassination PNC conspiracy
against
the Guyanese emancipatory movement. It operates in close co-operation
with
the „House of Israel“ and the „Death Squad“.
Before elaborating the
fear-instilling
„Death Squad“ and the awe-inspiring „House of Israel“, let us introduce
briefly
the Guyana Police Force (GPF), the Young Socialist Movement (YSM) and
the
Women Revolutionary Socialist Movement (WRSM). In 1964, the British
Guiana
police force had numbered 1,635; by 1977, the Guyana Police Force was
3,751
strong, and today it amounts to about 4,500. 245)
Expenditure on the GPF increased
from G$ 7.7 million in 1970, to G$ 30.3 million in 1980. 246)
However, in spite of this, 293.5% hike, the criminality rate increased
accordingly, and since 1976,
Crime Chief „Skip“ Roberts did not bother to present further police
reports.
In 1981, he came to the conclusion: „It is time the police counter
violence
with violence“. 247)
By then, the police force
was already converted into a loyal paramilitary suborganisation of the
Burnham regime.
On October 5, 1975,
the „Women’s
Auxiliary“ of the GDF was founded. A year later, after the formation of
the
GPM, it changed its name to the Women’s Revolutionary Socialist
Movement (WRSM).
Its kith and kin became organised in the Young Socialist Movement
(YSM). Over
the years, both organisations acquired a quasi-military status „in
their manner
of dress and patterns of behaviour during ceremonial and important
occasions“.
248)
Reliable sources estimated
that the current membership of both organisations is not much higher
than
2,500.
Let us now briefly
examine Burnham’s PNC „Death Squad“ alias „Hit Squad“ alias „Delta
Serra“. In 1963,
at the time of the „race riots“, the British Guiana secret service had
discovered a „Plan X13“ of a clandestine PNC organisation, led by
„Comrade L. F. S. Burnham“.
249)
It operated during the critical 1961-1964 period, when internal and
external forces threathened the Jagan
PPP Government. The then British Commissioner of Police had accused the
PNC
of „centrally directed thuggery“. A central figure of this PNC „Hit
Squad“
was the „Old Man“ (Comrade Van Genderen), an expert in political
assassinations.
In March, 1979, at the time of the WPA revolt, before Rodney’s
assassination,
the „Old Man“ was again seen in Georgetown, driving a sleek Mazda car,
carrying
a yellow PNC Government number-plate. 250)
At the same time, Idi Amin’s
ex-bodyguard was active in Georgetown, organising „security training“,
and
he was aided by three other specially-trained Britons. 251)
On November 20, 1979, the
WPA monitored a secret radio message from „Moonbeam“ to the „Chief of
Staff“,
which stated, inter alia: „Re Delta Serra, plans for attacks on known
WPA
members must be fatal“. 252)
On June 13, 1980, the planned attack on the most prominent WPA leader,
Dr. Walter Rodney, was „fatal“.
Let us briefly
elaborate the military essence of the two most significant religious
cults in Guyana during the 1970s: the „People’s Temple“ and the „House
of Israel“. Concerning both, various publications provided extensive
scientific data, including
background and descriptive materials. 253)
The Jonestown holocaust became worldknown, however, its true story,
revealing its historic essence, has
not been written as yet. We will not add further speculative oil to
this
horrendous burning prairie of „religious“ mystery cults. In another
work,
we will introduce some essential investigative starting-points for
future
unbiased scientific enquiry and impeccable scholarship. 254)
It suffices to state that
precisely the political functions and military roles of another
religious
cult, the „House of Israel“ reveal the true military-political nature
of
the Jonestown „cooperative“ within the general context of PNC military
dictatorship
and its relation to international geopolitics. Owing to space
limitation,
we will just briefly analyse metrically the essential features of this
Guyanese
military phenomenon.
Guyana is a secure
haven for all unwanted criminals and dangerous fugitives of the world.
At least
four of the „dozens of US fugitives“, whom the PNC Government had given
political sanctuary, enjoy a comfortable life in Guyana. The most
prominent figure
among them is David Hill, who had fled Cleveland in 1972, while he was
appealing
conviction of corporate blackmail. 255)
Under a new name, Rabbi Edwad Emmanuel Washington of the „House of
Israel“, he is leading his 8,000 members cult, which has striking
similarities with the „People’s Temple“ of Jim Jones. What Burnham
practices on a national scale, the Rabbi applies in his own „House“
- analogous to Jones’ authoritarianism in his „Temple“. 256)
Like Jones, and measured by
PNC elitist standards, at present, the „Rabbi“ is one of the wealthiest
men
and property-owners of Guyana. He lives in PNC high society, reflects
its
grand styles, and adores big and fast luxurious cars. He has nothing to
fear,
because he knows how to manoeuvre his big friends, L.F.S.B. and Green.
Besides,
the GDF supplies his „House“ with weapons, and they are charged to the
PNC.
257)
On May 3, 1982, the „Rabbi“
and his followers organised a May procession through the streets of
Georgetown,
and he reminded the Opposition that he was a „military force“ to be
reckoned
with. 258)
In this context, Burnham’s message was clear: „the Venezuelans are at
the border and the Rabbi is at
your door. So mind yourself!“ 259)
Externally, Venezuela, and internally, the „Rabbi“ and the „Death
Squad“, which are probably synonymous, everynight lull Burnham to a
„sound“ sleep, which is filled with UMHEP sweet dreams, and which are
enveloped in the aura of a 75,000 man strong military machine. Only now
and then, WPA nightmares disturb this involutionary „deep sleep“.
During the day, the „Prince“ is shaping his Orwellian future.
Between 1966 and 1970,
the political contradictions within both the PPP and PNC had deepened.
Many Afro-Guyanese
leaders, like George Bowman, left Jagan’s PPP and crossed the floor
towards
the ruling PNC. However, far more detrimental was the departure of
Indo-Guyanese
popular PPP stalwarts, like Ranji Chandisingh and Vincent Teekah, who
left
for the PNC in the 1970s. The PNC regime immediately elevated them to
„window-dressing“
posts, and was ready to discard them, when they have „served their
purpose“.
Later, Teekah (assasinated in 1979) became the PNC Minister of
Education,
and he was succeeded by Chandisingh. After the 1968 elections,
extraparliamentary
opposition against the monolithic bloc of „race“ parties - PNC and PPP
-
concentrated itself in university circles. The contradiction PNC-PPP
revealed
its negation, which since 1950 was latently present within the PPP, and
it
became the political tendency of the Ratoon Group. Among the members of
the
Ratoon Group, centred at the University of Guyana, were such prominent
figures
as: Dr. Walter Rodney, Dr. Clive Thomas, Joshua Ramsammy, Maurice Odle,
Miles
Fitzpatrick, Tage Singh, Paul Nehru Tennassee (the „Venezuelan spy“)
and
Omawalee (cousin of Hamilton Green). After Stokeley Carmichael’s
lecturing
tour of Guyana, „racial“ pressures unravelled the political
contradiction
within Ratoon, and it split. 260)
Consequently, Ramsammy, affected
by the influence of international Maoist tendencies, founded his
„Movement
Against Oppression (MAO), which became active in the Georgetown „Tiger
Bay“
slum area, where social unrest (in the Granger style of Trinidad in
1970)
had erupted.
It was the epoch of
the appearance
of „Red China“ on the world capitalist platform, consequently, many
Maoist
tendencies emerged in Guyana and elsewhere. As we will see later, at
that
time, even Burnham was on a China-trip, as far as foreign policy was
concerned.
Even Brindley Benn, the Deputy Prime Minister in Jagan’s PPP Government
(1961-1964),
turned „Maoist“ and founded the Working People’s Vanguard Party (WPVP).
Furthermore,
PNC cross-overs to the extra-parliamentary opposition occurred. In
1970,
Eusi Kwayana (a future WPA leader) broke away from the PNC and founded
the
Afro-Guyanese „African Society for Cultural Relations with Independent
Africa“
(ASCRIA). In 1972, Moses Bhagwan (another future WPA leader) broke away
from
the PPP and founded the Indo-Guyanese „Indian Political Revolutionary
Association“
(IPRA). What was left in both PNC and PPP, after their „revolutionary“
appearance
forms gradually disappeared, was the contradictory essence of Burnham’s
political
dictatorship. Around 1978, in an atmosphere of „critical support“,
Burnham
and Jagan, hand-in-hand were reaching for the stars. Ratoon openly
supported
IPRA, which indicated the growing „non-racial“ tendencies, within the
nascent
future WPA organisation. In general, however, virulent „racism“ was
still
very active in all these extraparliamentary oppositional movements. For
example,
at the beginning or the 1970s, the MAO again founded a new
pro-Indo-Guyanese
revolutionary organisation, the National Liberation Front (NLF), led by
Mohammed
Insanally. Within the frame work of the international
„Marxist-Christian
dialogue“ other oppositional groups appeared. Campbell Johnston founded
the
Guyana Industrial and Social Research Association (GISRA), which
introduced
Roman Catholic political resistance, centred around the Catholic
Standard,
which opposes Burnham’s PNC Government ever since, But, even D’Aguiar’s
UF,
while disintegrating, had produced involutionary contradictory
political
fruits. Llewellyn John, a former PNC Minister of Home Affairs, formed
the
People’s Democratic Movement (PDM) and Dr. Gunraj Kumar founded the
Liberator
Party (LP) – both were more or less associated with the old UF
liberal-capitalist tendency. Although both of them participated in the
fraudulent 1973 elections, only the LP won 2 seats; the rest were
divided between the PNC (37) and the
PPP (14).
After the Sophia
Declaration,
on November 30, 1974, Ratoon, IPRA, ASCRIA and WPVP front
united to form an extraparlimentary front against the monolithic
PNC/PPP
Government Bloc. This marked the birth of the Working People’s Alliance
(WPA).
It was an evolutionary product of political exasperation about PPP
betrayal
of its „communist“ ideals and of economic perplexity about PNC
realisation
of its „socialist“ objectives. Out of this PPP „negation“ and PNC
„affirmation“,
the new WPA revolutionary synthesis was born. It quickly shed its
Mao-appearance
form, when Brindley Bonn’s WPVP broke away in September, 1976; 261)
and within the next three years,
it rapidly became a „multi-racial“ working class tendency.
During the period 1976
to 1980, aided by its real historic father, Jagan’s PPP, the WPA
developed towards a strong emancipatory force against PNC
„paramountcy“. On July 27, 1979,
it declared itself
a revolutionary party with
a socialist programme and voiced its determination to overthrow the
Burnham
regime „by all means necessary“. 262)
Under the collective leadership
of Walter Rodney, Clive Thomas, Rupert Roopnaraine, Moses Bhagwan and
Eusi
Kwayana, it became popular among the urban workers, and even penetrated
Burnham’s
personal „kingdom“, the bauxite industry at Linden. For the first time
in
Guyanese history, a proletarian tendency was creating revolutionary
possibilities,
was constructing a working class-for-it-self. A real material threat,
the
negation to Burnham’s military dictatorship within Guyanese history was
forming
itself. It had to be „nipped in the bud“, before it could bloom.
Burnham’s
negative, reactionary impersonation found its affirmative,
revolutionary
counterpart in Rodney’s emancipatory integrity. One of them had to be
destroyed
- the historically weaker reproduction. Thus, who had assassinated
Rodney
historically, dialectics, the science and logic of motion, could reveal
very
easily. However, the murder of an individual expression of a historical
emancipatory
process could be a great loss and a momentarily set-back, but it never
implies
the destruction of historically created material conditions which
produce
Rodneys, Ches and Cabrals. Based in the fundamental contemporary
contradiction
„capital-labour“, even in Guyana, they will continuously and
continuatively
reproduce their social expression and personal exclamation. Currently,
the
WPA, like the PNC and PPP in the 1960s and 1970s, is shedding its
„racial“
and „petty-bourgeois“ appearance forms, and it is embarking on its
essential
historic objective, on a protractive, evolutionary struggle, leading a
revolutionary
working class-in-itself. However, as we have noted, its genesis was a
painful
birth, similarly, its current revolutionary synthesis towards a real
proletarian
party is accompanied by many perils. Consequently, we should not
glorify
the WPA as the new „Saviour“ or the old „Beelzebub“ of Guyana. What is
a
name? Future blossoming and flowering of the Guyanese proletarian
movement
will „smell just as sweet“. In this sense, the revolutionary flambeau
„flamboyantly
will blaze the trail which Rodney historically had illuminated, by
paying
the highest human price. Already now, its emancipatory radiation and
radiance
is generating severe repercussions, is emanating social dynamite within
the
Burnham-Green contradiction, in the very heart of the decomposing PNC.
The 1966 British
Guiana Constitution
Conference in London had accepted the draft constitution submitted by
the
PNC, which fundamentally was based on the „Westminster Model“. However,
within
the legal framework of the Guyana Constitution, in the 1970s, the PNC
could
not realise its „socialist“ dream of „paramountcy“ of the ruling party
over
the Government, and establish its open authoritarian military
dictatorship.
As a result of this complication, the PNC Government, with cunning
„socialist“
tricks, dictated a „referendum“ to the Guyanese peoples, whose outcome
would
give the PNC a blank cheque to rob them of all their human resources
and
rights. In a typical PNC style, the „referendum“ of of July 10, was
„rigged“
mercilessly. 263)
On July 16, 1978, New Nation proudly reported: „Total YES votes
amounted to an impressive 419,936 which represents 97.4% of the 431,120
votes cast from the local and overseas electoral
role of 609,225 voters. NO votes totalled a meagre 8,956 at home and
abroad
- 2.07%. Spoilt votes amounted to 2,228 or 0.51%.“ 264)
After this political
coup d’etat, without any further hindrances, the PNC could pass its new
„socialist“ Constitution and inaugurate the Second Republic in 1980.
Burnham became,
all in one, Supreme Executive President, Supreme Executive Authority,
Head
of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. 265)
Thus, he combines the powers
of a Prime Minister under the „Westminster Model“ and those of an
executive
President under the US constitution. A more detailed analysis of this
usurpation
of political power is certainly necessary, but it would surpass the
limits
of our short essay and would deviate the analytic flow of its
argumentation.
However, for further reading, we would suggest other excellent
political
analyses. 266)
On December 15, 1980,
general
elections under the provisions of the new constitution had been held,
and
the „rigged“ results were as follows: „PNC 77.04% of votes cast - 41
seats; PPP 19.03% - 10 seats; UF 2.86% - 2 seats.“ 267)
Hence, we see that politically
D’Aguiar’s United Force is recovering economically again, mainly due to
the
current IMF/World Bank pressures to give private enterprise a new lease
of
life. In addition, as a result of this political manoeuvre, Burnham’s
PNC
Government gave its „co-operative socialism“ a parliamentary,
democratic
„human“ face. But, the PNC is fooling only itself. In reality, the
1978-1980
political events, including their Draconian aftermath, very clearly
reflect
the PNC version of the historical crime which the South African
„racist“
apartheid Government, ever since 1960, had committed against its
oppressed
Black peoples. 268)
We will conclude this
part with a general summary of Guyana’s foreign policy between 1966 and
1984.
It will be followed by a brief analysis of the Guyana/Venezuela border
dispute since the termination of the Protocol of Port-of-Spain.
Thereafter, we will re-evaluate and revalorise our central hypothesis
and its logical corollaries in the light of future Guyanese historical
processes. As we have outlined, between 1966 and 1970, the Guyana
Government had followed a consistent pro-imperialist,
anti-Soviet, anti-China and anti-Cuban foreign policy. During that
period,
Burnham’s Commonwealth Caribbean integrationist efforts had paved the
road
towards „non-alignment“, and, consequently, towards Africa and the
East.
At, the beginning of the 1970s, the People’s Republic of China was
recovering
from its „Cultural Revolution“ and it began to aspire for „socialist“
influence
in the „Third World“, especially in Africa. Before 1970, the PNC had
recognised
Taiwan and had accepted its technical assistance teams. This attitude
corresponded
with general US foreign policy. When the administrations of Richard
Nixon
and Edward Reath indicated a new attitude within their „Red China“
policies,
Burnham rapidly decided to outdo them. As pre-condition, within the
context
of his „non-alignment thrust“, although very reluctantly, Burnham had
to
renounce his past intimacy with London and Washington. 269)
The Africa „foreign policy safari“ of 1970 ushered in this PNC new
look. The Lusaka Non-Alignment Summit Conference of 1970, and Burnham’s
promise to donate to the African Liberation Fund, opened up new vistas
for PNC opportunism and vacillation in foreign policy.
The 1971 Singapore
Commonwealth
Ministers’ Conference, which Burnham attended, assisted him to make a
first
„Eastern“ move. Having internal „racial“ problems in mind, in India, he
had
cordial talks with Mrs. Gandhi. These were reported in detail in
Guyanese
means of social communication. We would recall that in the same year
the
World Bank had refused a loan to Guyana, which functioned as a warning
to Burnham about the real material base of his „Eastern“ drive.
However, the
PNC was cognisant of the fact that it could not expect much economic
aid
from „Third World“ or „nonaligned“ countries. On the other hand, gamble
for
votes of these countries in the United Nations, especially concerning
Guyana’s
„border disputes“, was a chance worth taking. In 1971, Guyana and the
People’s
Republic of China hosted each other reciprocally. 270)
China promised Guyana G$ 30
million worth of, trade, technical and financial assistance, to be
spread
over 5 years. 271)
Consequently, in the United
Nations, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago voted for the pro-Peking
resolution,
submitted by Albania. In spite of the fact, that Barbados and Jamaica
abstained,
and Venezuela, Haiti and the Dominican Republic voted with the USA, no
reprisals
came from Washington, because, in any case, the US tide was moving
calmly
eastwards. In April, 1971, Burnham had established diplomatic relations
with
the Soviet Union, thus he kept all doors open. In the years that
followed,
however, the Chinese and the Soviets quickly grasped the essence of PNC
foreign
policy; and, very reluctantly, „communist“ trade and „rubles“ drifted
towards
the „Garden City“ of South America. Currently, Chinese diplomatic
relations
are merely nominal, and the Soviet ones are essentially of a strategic
nature,
especially after the debacle of Grenada.
From 1974 onwards,
diplomatic
trade and cultural relations between Cuba and Guyana had improved
rapidly.
But, Burnham balanced this trend with similar relations to Haiti. 272)
On January 18, 1976, the Government
of Guyana announced its recognition of the MPLA Government of Angola. 273)
Earlier, secretly, it had supported
Agostinho Neto in his liberation struggle, and had permitted Cuban
planes
on their way to Luanda, to refuel in Georgetown. 274)
On October 6, 1976, the „Cubana
Disaster’’ occurred, an event which affected Guyana’s relations with
the
USA and Venezuela. A Cubana de Aviacion (Flight CU-455) exploded
shortly
after taking off from Grantley Adams International Airport, en route
for
Cuba, killing all 73 people on board - among them 57 Cubans, 11
Guyanese
and 5 North Koreans. Cuba and Guyana accused the CIA-FBI complex of
having
been involved in this gruesome act. 275)
Jagan and Burnham saw this
as another „destabilisation“ act, because Guyana „had chosen the
Socialist
Path“. 276)
In a public statement, Burnham stressed that the PNC „was bent on
socialism“ and it did not want to „prostitute itself“ in the „sinful
bed“ with „rightists“, who are „agents of an Agency“. This was an
indirect attack on D’Aguiar’s UF. In the same speech of October
6, 1976, Burnham accused the American Embassy in Caracas of having
masterminded this sabotage act. Many years later, a Cuban exile,
Ricardo Morales, confessed to US Attorney Douglas Williams, in front of
Circuit Judge, Gerald Kogan,
that the CIA and FBI were involved in the above shameful, inhuman act. 277)
Until today, the trial of
the accused, the Cuban exiles, Orlando Bosch and Luis Posadas Carriles,
and
the Venezuelans, Freddy Lugo and Hernan Ricardo Lozano, is still
lingering
on in Caracas. 278)
At that time, in 1976,
Guyana
continued her „expanding pattern of relations with Eastern Europe and
China,
Middle-Eastern and African and Asian States“ 279),
but she gave Caribbean and
South American relations priority. A year earlier, in 1975, Burnham had
visited
Venezuela, in an attempt to further Guyanese participation in the Latin
American
System (SELA). Until 1977, the PNC was mainly preoccupied with
international
„decolonisation“ issues, especially in Southern Africa, „Third World
Solidarity“
and the New International Economic Order. 280)
The PPP, which had moved from „non-cooperation and civic resistance“
(1973) to „critical support“ of the
PNC, as late as 1979, still praised the PNC for its „more forth right
position against imperialism, both in
domestic and foreign
policy“. 281)
This was long after Burnham
had signed the secret agreement with the US-controlled „Trojan Horse“,
the
IMF. Also, it was long after the US President Gerald Ford had stated in
1975,
that „the United States had built a meaningful relationship with Guyana
through
the years on the basis of a mutual understanding, distinct aspirations
and
many broad and frank discussions“. 282)
This statement came when PNC
„co-operative socialism“ had reached its zenith, and was revealing its
essential
neo-colonialist core. The above is an excellent example to demonstrate,
what
we have stressed earlier, that neither PNC „socialism“ nor PPP
„communism“
had ever reflected the true, emancipatory interests of Guyana’s working
peoples.
Since 1977, the PNC
regime openly shifted its foreign policy in favour of the United States
and the
„West“. The 1977 and 1978 US Annual State Department Reports gave
Burrham
a „clean vest“; they even assisted the PNC in its cover-ups for the
Jonestown suicide-massacre. The IMF, the Britsh Labour Government and
the EEC, all
came to the rescue of „co-operative socialism“. Jagan’s PPP, since
1980,
again began to contradict PNC policies, and by 1983, the „Leader of the
Opposition“
openly condemned even the WPA. 283)
This pro-Western, pro-imperialist
PNC Government trend in Guyanese foreign policy continues until today.
The
unsuccessful flirting with the World Bank/IMF complex and international
corporations
of the 1982/1983 period verifies this unquestionable truth. Currently,
PNC
foreign policy had shed all its past appearance leaves and its true
neo-colonialist
stem is visible. Let us now examine in general outline what this
denotes
within the context of the Guyana/Venezuela Limitrophe problem.
Ever since the signing
of the Protocol of Port-of-Spain in 1970, nothing substantial to solve
the border conflict had materialised. From April 2-3, 1981, Burnham
visited Caracas,
and he had talks with his Venezuelan counterpart, President Herrera
Campins.
On his return to Georgetown, on April 4, 1981, he gave a press
conference
at the Film Centre. On the same day, President Campins had issued a
statement
at Miraflores, terminating officially the Protocol. 284)
Inter alia, he had „ratified
Venezuela’s claim to the Essequibo Territory“ and „rejected any
compromise
incompatible with Venezuela’s claim“. 285)
As mentioned earlier, he also rejected the UMHEP programme.
Before continuing, and
before
stating Burnham’s reaction, it is pertinent to note that in the border
conflict
discussions, which took place on November 5, 1963, and which terminated
with
the signing of the Geneva Agreement in February, 1966, the Guyanese
delegation,
headed by Burnham, played a significant role. Later, Burnham boasted
that
this agreement was the result of „brilliant statesmanship“.
Consequently,
de jure and de facto, Burnham, with his signature had underlined that a
„boundary
dispute“ between Guyana and Venezuela does exist. The „no blade of
grass“
smokescreen of 1968/1969 cannot obliterate this historical fact.
Whether
he should have signed this agreement or not, and why a actually signed,
are
different stories altogether. 286)
Even in his reply to the Miraflores
statement, Burnham displayed the PNC opportunistic, inconsequent and
inconsistent
attitude in foreign policies. Now, suddenly, his „Government’s
position“
was that „the 1899 Arbitral award was entirely valid“. 287)
Now, Venezuela is the „New Conquistador“ and its claim is titulated as
„Venezuelan Revanchism“. What
about the claim of Guyana’s impoverished working masses - including
those
in the Essequibo - for a decent, healthy, democratic life, which has
been
„despoiled“ by PNC conquistadores and chauvinism? What has the man, who
exclaimed,
on March 26, 1981, „I am the Government“, to say about his „healthy“
state
of life - „I smoke, I drink, I ride, I swim, I shoot... I am?” 288)
As we have noted until now,
all these have nothing to do with either socialism or communism. At
least,
in the 1983 general elections, the „revanchists“ and „conquistadores“
have
demonstrated what they understand by democracy. As a result of a
complete
deadlock on the issue, reflected in the different choices of means of
settlement
provided by the Geneva Agreement, both countries had to refer the
matter
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de
Cuellar.
289)
Currently, the negotiations
are still in process, and no satisfactory solution is as yet in sight.
Concerning the above
juridical
aspects of the conflict, and its implications within the context of
international
law and agreements, we will leave the matter to the appropriate
qualified
experts and authorities to accomplish legal disentanglement and to
arrive
at just solutions and resolutions. In conclusion, within the framework
of our scientific investigation, a simple judgement stares in the face
of contemporary
historical reality. In fact, the historical key to the material essence
of
the problem both Venezuela and Guyana have supplied, when they
concentrated
their claim in its most realistic substance: The Essequibo Is Ours! 290)
„Ours“ is what „We“ have produced
historically on the planet, Earth. Who have produced the Essequibo, to
them
it belongs. Who has exploited the Essequibo and its peoples has no
legitimate,
historical right to the territory. As corollary, who intends to do
likewise,
has even a lesser human right or claim. Consequently, if we apply
materialist
and historical dialectics, only when the Essequibo belongs to the
Guyanese
and Venezuelan peoples, in fact, to all the South American working
peoples,
and its human and natural resources are utilised in a democratic manner
for
the emancipation of mankind, only then, the historical, material
conditions
can be created for a lasting solution. Burnham cannot permit the
solution
of any of his border disputes, because it would mean the immediate end
of
his PNC regime. For Venezuela, to solve this conflict, is to solve, at
the same time, Guyana’s real historical problem, that is, to contribute
to the economic, political and social emancipation of the Essequibo and
Guyana as
a whole.
1)
Every
epistemology has, or must have, a scientific method and methodology.
Its
truth can only be verified in universal and in historical reality, by
using
the scientific tool of social theory-praxis. Our scientific,
dialectical
method revealed essential features, processes, phenomena,
contradictions
and synthesis within Guyanese history, and it has placed them in a
global
and historical context of evolution-involution. Consequently, the first
verification
of our central hypothesis was the test of the truth and accuracy of its
method
in human, social and historical reality.
2)
We
have not only proved that Guyanese history is a particular process,
within
the context of general human production, we have also demonstrated
that,
since 1499, it became an extraterritorially - directed colonialist -
imperialist
process of human exploitation, oppression, suppression and
discrimination.
It generated its specific Guyanese social contradictions, which
essentially
contained total emancipatory latencies, tendencies and developments
against
capitalist processes of British colonial subjugation and current
neo-colonial
domination.
3)
Guianese
Nationalism, like most nationalisms of the „Third World“ of the postwar
epoch,
had an anti-imperialist drive, but not necessarily an anti-capitalist
material
essence. The PPP founded by Jagan and Burnham expressed the zenith of
of
Guianese Nationalism. It revealed its real essence, by discarding its
appearance
forms, within the context of evolving Guyanese history.
4)
Jagan’s
„communism“ and Burnham’s „socialism“, in microcosmos, reproduced all
the
social contradictions of the epoch of „de-colonisation“. Progressively,
they
favoured the post-war international division of labour, and
international division of the world into „spheres of influence“ of the
two Super Powers. Until today, Jagan represents Soviet interests, and
Burnham’s „co-operative socialism“ is the special version of
contemporary neo-colonialism. This ideological
contradiction resulted in the creation of the WPA in the mid-1970s.
5)
Ever
since the First Republic (1970), progressively Burnham’s „paramountcy“
and
Jagan’s „opposition“ had crystallised into the material reality of the
PNC
military dictatorship. Without Jagan’s „opposition“, it could not have
developed
its current neofascistic, neo-colonial, „racist“ material essence. In
the
late 1970s, this PNC/PPP unity-and-contradiction-of-opposites had
produced
its germinating historical negation, Rodney’s WPA, as a political party.
6)
Logically,
in the 1980s, at the time of the Second Republic, the PNC/PPP
Government
bloc openly had to negate the working class interests as reflected in
the
WPA. However, the current form, organisation, strategy and policy of
the
WPA do not yet reflect a true challenge to the oppressive Guyana
Government.
It cannot bring about immediate social revolutionary qualitative
changes
in Guyanese society. The historical, material and intellectual
conditions,
nationally and internationally, are not as yet existent for such a
revolutionary
proletarian step forward.
7)
Consequently,
the acquisition of political power, by any revolutionary political
party,
existent or newborn, still will not signify the control and direction
of
economic power in Guyana in the immediate future. It will only
introduce
quantitative social reforms, but not social or socialist revolution.
8)
Because
the serious monetary repercussions in the Guyanese bankrupt economy -
which
strangles PNC State capital accumulation - reflect themselves directly
in
PNC class formation; consequently they also generate involutionary
political
processes. Already, the Burnham-Green contradiction in the PNC
indicates
further decompository processes. But, the dethronement of PNC
„paramountcy“
and military dictatorship will be an
arduous, protracted
struggle. Except the hovering possibility of a „palace revolution“, or
a
desperate, violent „armed conspiracy“, or even a manipulated coup
d’etat,
which will not bring about essential structural social changes, the
next
five years, have no revolutionary „surprise“ in store for Guyana.
9)
Although
social revolutions have no recipes, no time-table and there is nothing
„classical“
about them, world permanent revolution, due to unequal and combined
processes,
continuity and discontinuity, at any time, can change latencies and
tendencies
into „surprising“ historical realities; certainly, it could affect the
historical
development of Guyana.
10)
Finally,
because of their limitrofe problems, their geographical proximity,
their
historical relations and their human, democratic aspirations, Guyana,
Venezuela
and Suriname, but also the rest of South America and the Caribbean,
will
have the last revolutionary word on this matter. They themselves have
to
accomplish the historic task of creating total Human Freedom. Only
then,
the Malvinas or the Essequibo will be truly Ours.
