Certain historical,
material
and intellectual conditions had to be existent, to enable „co‑operative
socialism“
to come into existence in Guyana. Without these, it would be
impossible.
Without knowing these, we cannot change and improve living conditions
in
Guyana; in fact, without the knowledge of the above, Guyana and
Venezuela
cannot create the historical conditions to solve and resolve their
limitrophe
contradiction. Furthermore, from this scientific point of departure, we
can
identify and determine the political‑qualitative essence of Burnham’s
„socialism“
and Jagan’s „communism“, within the dialectical framework of the
general international
pro‑ and anti‑capitalist forces, tendencies and latencies of our epoch.
For
the time being, it suffices to state that every thing that glitters is
not
necessarily gold; in an analogous manner, every thing is not
anti‑capitalist
that has a „socialist“ or „communist“ appearance form, that uses
extravagant
„Marxist“ verbalism, phraseology and sophistry. The scientific
verification
of historic truth, which will enable true human emancipation, is the
empirical
investigation of concrete socio‑historic reality, in a nut‑shell, of
human
theory‑praxis. 2)
Before embarking on
our
analytic venture, it is necessary to state beforehand that the limits
and
limitations of this brief essay do not permit us to give the necessary
precision
and concise definition to such general concepts and categories as
colonialism,
capitalism, imperialism, socialism, communism and democracy. Because
all
the above terms are enveloped and veiled in an opague smog of
ideological
appearance forms, to avoid misinterpretations and misunderstanding, it
is
necessary that they should be given concise, precise scientific
connotations.
Under the current circumstances, we can only refer to other works of
the
author, which have attempted to radicate and irradicate their
scientific
analytic essence. 3)
On the other hand, within the
scientific spectrum of this analysis, their real meanings logically,
will
reveal themselves. To evade or circumvent their usage would be
scientific
dishonesty, it would debar that what they concretely express in
contemporary
reality.
After this
introductory
warning, let us regress to our topic, to that what has been spotlighted
before.
Certain transhistoric, transnational factors, among them, pro‑ and
anti‑capitalist
forces, have channelled Guianese historic potentiality into a definite
process
towards „co‑operative socialism“. These we will elaborate now.
Throughout
the colonial history of British Guiana, we can witness the
coming‑into‑existence of a major social conflict. It was generated by
the social and „racial“ tensions
and pressures between the haves and the have‑nots, between the wealthy
planters,
farmers, businessmen and traders and the impoverished slaves, helots
and
pariahs of the British colony. 4)
This social contradiction had
produced diverse forms of oppression and resistance; it eventually
epitomised
in a specific irreconcilable antagonism of the 1930s: British
Colonialism
versus Guianese Labour Resistance. The international capitalist crisis
of
the 1930s had produced intense labour unrest, not only in the
metropolitan
countries, but also in their colonies. Originally, the general labour
resistance
in the British colony concentrated itself around the British Guiana
Workers’
League (BGWL, 1931). 5)
Its political pressure was centred
within the social ambit of factory, municipal and government workers.
Although
the Indo‑Guianese majority was mainly employed in the sugar and rice
industries,
the origin of the labour movement had a certain „multi‑racial“ or
„transracial“
imprint. 6)
This historical fact, at the same
time, pinpoints the original genetic essence and anti‑colonial content
of
the labour‑nationalist political process. In spite of the ephemeral
„racist“
appearance forms, the oppressive, exploitative nature of British
colonialism
necessarily had to create its own contradiction within the ranks of the
totality
of subjugated peoples. Subjectively, however, the policies of the
leading
figures, who generally came from various middle class sections,
reflected
a different political world outlook. 7)
Within the next half
decade,
labour revolts spread to the important sugar industry, especially under
the
direction of the Manpower Citizens’ Association (MPCA, 1937). 8)
It was this expansion of the labour
conflict which gave the movement its specific well‑known Indo‑Guianese
impetus;
a trend which will continue until the 1960s. Logically, the British
Government
had to try to neutralise this new challenging Guianese labour
affirmation.
It appointed the Moyne Commission to investigate the „labour
disturbances“,
and to suggest possible social reforms within the general colonialist
status
quo. 9)
In order to remain
within
the general context of historical processes, we should not overlook the
fact
that during that specific period in Guianese history, the world
capitalist
system was movirg inexorably towards one of its major crises, towards
the
Second World War, with all its fascistic, national‑socialistic and
anti‑communistic
implications. The repressive colonial waves of European
capitalism-imperialism
also lashed on the „Sea Wall“ of British Guiana, which was an integral
part
of the global plundering of natural and human resources. Consequently,
the
central capitalist contradiction, although it had its „nodal“ point in
the
„ mother‑countries“, indirectly also affected faraway products, for
example,
the British colonial interests, administered from Georgetown. The
political‑ideological contradiction „facism ‑ democracy“ within
capitalism, certainly, affected the minds of such proliferated leaders
as Dr. Cheddi Jagan and Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham. But it also
penetrated general social consciousness, and therewith, it could
interpenetrate the labour and nationalist movements. However,
such anomalies like the „Hitler‑Stalin Pact“ ‑ a „fascist‑communist“
gentlemen
agreement ‑ and the combined „Allied Forces“ against Nazi Germany ‑ a
unity‑and‑contradiction
of „democratic“ and „communist“ opposites, as synthesis against
„fascism“
‑ sowed confusion and disarray in the international socialist camp.
Ideologically,
these repercussions reverberated in the „Land of Many Flowing Waters“.
This
is an example par excellence of what we meant before by
complex‑multiplex historical processes, which determine each other, and
multiveloce movements, which affect and effect multifarious historical
developments. Within this general post‑war ideological maelstrom,
Jagan’s „communism“ and Burnhams’s
„socialism“ had their historical roots.
During the 1940s, in
British
Guiana itself, the objective‑ and subjective‑real conditions certainly
did
not reflect or produce either „democratic“ or „communist“ realities. In
a
political sense, what were existent, were insidious, volatile
„race‑class“
tensions and contradictions, typical symptom of British colonialist
rule.
These did not favour either an effective trade union unity or a true
conscious
political theory‑praxis. It is common knowledge that ideological
confusion
cannot lead to pragmatic political praxis, and, conversely, that
ineffective
human praxis never can produce real emancipatory theory. This
asymmetric,
dichotomous relation was responsible for the political havoc which
reigned
in the two trade union movements: the Trade Union Council (TUC, 1941)
and
the Guiana Idustrial Workers’ Union (GIWU, 1946). 10)
A sociological analysis of their membership and policies, certainly,
would reveal the germinating „racial“ centrifugal force which hampered
the emancipatory evolution of the labour movement. For our purposes, it
suffices to manifest that the GIWU, like the MPCA, had recruited its
rank and file mainly among the Indo‑Guianese sugar
estate workers; the Afro‑Guianese dominated TUC centred itself in town
and
industrial areas, within the field of operation of the old BGWL. 11)
This did not imply that the
Guianese labour movement, a product of its historic circumstances,
consciously
had taken a „racial“ path.
It is true that, in
1944,
the MPCA had affiliated itself to the TUC, and that the trade unions
under
the umbrella of the TUC had increased to 33 by 1947, but, this
quantitative
change did not generate any qualitative political tendencies. On the
contrary,
the Indo‑Guianese MPCA remained the most influential politico‑economic
force.
We should recollect that this attempted synthesis of Guianese labour
unity
had occurred in the post‑war epoch, at a time, when across the globe
numerous
anti‑colonial national and nationalist „independence“ movements came
into
being. A fervent desire to accomplish „democracy“ and „self
‑government“
was felt across the whole colonial world. Structural changes within the
international
capitalist‑imperialist system ‑
inter alia, the neutralisation of German imperialism and the triumph of
American world „reconstruction“
‑ forced the traditional metropolitan countries to „de‑colonise“ their
most
profitable possessions. In this internatioanal atmosphere of
establishing
„democracy“, safeguarding „peace“ and effecting peaceful
decolonization“,
the material conditions were created to make Guianese anti‑colonial
nationalism
possible. In particular, the evolution and the existence of a labour
movement
and general anti‑colonial resistance in British Guiana was the material
sine
qua non for the genesis of post‑war political nationalism. Of course,
Guianese
nationalism had other historical antecedents, which dated back to the
slave
revolts, to the emancipation of the slaves, and to strikes and protests
of
the workers in the factories and on the rice and sugar fields. 12)
In theoretical coherence with
our methodological approach, and in analytic cohesion with our
dialectical
method, we must emphasise that Guianese labour was moving towards a
political expression, and, conversely, Guianese nationalism was
progressively approximating a working class base. Whether the latter
motion achieved actualisation we
will see below.
In November, 1947, Dr.
Cheddi
Jagan was elected to a seat in the Legislative Assembly of British
Guiana.
13)
The militant leadership of the
GIWU ‑ an organisation which, meanwhile, had surpassed the MPCA twice
in
size - openly supported Jagan’s projected policies. In effect, this
simply
means that it favoured his nationalist drive towards „independence“. At
the
same time, we should keep in mind, that it was no historical
coincidence
that this labour‑nationalist synthesis had a
decisive
Indo‑Guianese momentum. Furthermore, it should be noted, that this
historic
process had very little to do with either „socialism“ or „communism“,
at
least not on Guianese soil. Thus, the social dynamics of the historical
situation
had created a new contradiction: Guianese Nationalism ‑ British
Colonialism.
But, real political workers’ unity remained only a possibility, a
process
in latency‑tendency, not a reality.
Nonetheless, in spite
of
the difficult situation, various trade unionist and political leaders
tried
to form and forge working class unity. This was all the more
complicated
because a real working class movement was then only existing in
embryonic
form. Despite this obstacle, Dr. J. B. Singh founded his British Guiana
Labour
Party (BGLP) and Jagan established his Political Affairs Committee
(PAC).
14)
Within a very short period,
this nationalist‑political drive to counter the disastrous effects of
British
colonial „divide and rule“ and „racism“ evolved into yet another
historical
synthesis. In 1950, the BGLP (now under the direction of Burnham) and
the
PAC (still led by Jagan) amalgamated to form the historic People’s
Progressive
Party (PPP) ‑ the matrix of all contemporary contradictions in Guyana. 15)
This new „unity‑and‑contradiction“
very distinctly revealed the antagonistic tendencies within Guianese
politics,
by unmasking the two real faces of Guianese Nationalism. Ever since,
they
became known as Jagan’s Indo-Guianese „communism“ and Burnham’s
Afro‑Guianese
„socialism“. The concrete, total truth of the matter was that none of
them
was an affirmation of the deepest emancipatory desires of the Guianese
peoples
as a whole, in line with total human emancipation. Thirty years later,
Walter
Rodney’s „Working People’s Alliance (WPA) would demonstrate the true
affirmation
within Guyanese liberation struggle.
What really occurred,
was
that the general political contradiction of the 1950s was reflected in
microcosmos
in the Guianese PPP. Under Stalin’s reign, the real scientific content
and
essence of the October Revolution was putrefied and petrified by a
brutal,
vulgar materialism. 16)
Scientific socialism, with the
dialectics at heart and the dialectical method in mind, was reduced to
orthodoxy
and dogma. All emancipatory and revolutionary fire were taken from its
very
essence. „Marxists“ forgot to study Hegel’s „Logics“ ‑ as Lenin so
urgently
had suggested to do - and thus, they failed to apply dialectics and the
dialectical
method to their own theories and praxis, especially to „socialism“ and
„communism“
themselves. The historical results of this equivocation were
catastrophic
‑ also in Guyana. Thus, the Guianese PPP was born at a time when the
international
socialist movement had reached its revolutionary nadir, and when
Stalinist
„socialism in one country“ had reached its zenith of
„bourgeois‑democratic“
reaction. The logical contradiction of all these was that imperialism
could
recover under the United States flag, and, consequently, that Great
Britain
could direct „independence“ and „self‑government“ affairs into safe
channels
of „de‑colonisation“.
Let us now continue to
expound
the essential developments during this decisive period of Guyanese
history.
The reaction of the British Government to the Jagan‑Burnham nationalist
coalition
was to appoint another commission of investigation ‑ the Waddington
Commission. It was given the authority to revise the colonial
constitution and to pave
the road towards „self‑government“. 17)
Under the provisions of the
new constitution, general elections were hold in 1953. The
Jagan‑Burnham
PPP won 18 of the 24 contested seats. 18)
Not only within the PPP contradiction,
but already in the parliamentary opposition, a new Afro‑Guianese
national‑capitalist
tendency was gaining impetus. The other two contesting parties in the
1953
elections, the National Democratic Party (NDP) and the People’s
National
Party (PNP), strongly represented latent anti‑Indo-Guianese and
national‑capitalist interests. The British Crown reacted negatively to
the election results and demonstrated its real political and military
hegemony. It suspended the constitution
in October, 1953, and for the period 1953‑1957, a British‑nominated
ministry
and an all‑nominated legislature, as „Interim Government“ administered
Guianese
colonial matters. 19)
The reason for this negation
of Guianese Nationalism was less a result of impotence, but rather one
of
taking the opportunity to put the right man and the correct party at
the
helm of future „de‑colonisation“. The British Government knew with
certainty
who was the right figure, and, as we will see later, so did his sister,
Jessie
Burnham. 20)
That some fraternal „democratic“ help, as Japan claimed in his „West On
Trial“, came from Washington, was
just a logical minor side‑effect of the „independence“ Monopoly Game. 21)
Great Britain held all the key
cards for victory, including the one that concerned the
Guyana-Venezuela
border conflict. 22)
This unilateral
British
colonial act activated the „racial“ and „racist“ social pressures
within
the PPP, and the „race struggle“ exploded the superficial‑artificial
egg‑shell
of labour‑political nationalism. The PPP split into a Burnham and a
Jagan
faction. 23)
A nasty power struggle ensued,
a violent political vendetta engendered, which epitomised in the brutal
„race
riots“ of 1963/1964. 24)
The laughing third contestant
was British colonialism, which both factions were supposed to attack as
the
„mortal enemy“ of the subjugated colonial peoples. Guianese Nationalism
dissolved
into its two major historical component parts, which directly opposed
the
„transracial“ class interests of the working peoples. In honour of
Jagan,
and in full respect for his political errors, it must be stated that
his
position was more straightforward and honest. This is the reason, why
his
PPP will later generate its own contradiction, the WPA.
In 1957, the Renison
Constitution
dictated the next set of constitutional reformist rules to shape the
future
of British Guiana. 25)
During the general elections,
that followed in the same year, the Jagan PPP won 9 seats, the Burnham
PPP
3, and the newly formed United Democratic Party (UDP) and the
Amerindian
Party (AP) each could secure one. 26)
In October, 1957, Burnham officially
proclaimed his political direction: he founded a new party, the
people’s
National Congress (PNC). Thereby, he undersigned the stark political
reality
of Guianese seriocomic games. He began to set the „socialist“ sails of
the
Guianese boat, raised the British‑American „independence“ flag, steered
towards
Guyanese „self‑government“, driven along by the mighty „winds of
change“
of „cooperative socialism“.
In 1963/1964, British
Colonialism,
for the last time, applied its old „divide and rule“ tactics, including
its
„racial“ ideological components, in British Guiana. That these efforts
bore
fruits, precisely illustrated the fertile Guianese soil for such
colonial‑capitalist endeavours. Later, Burnham will fully exploit this
„racial“ social fertility, to further his own „co‑operative socialist“
interests. Severe social violence
and bloody „race riots“ erupted in British Guiana. Of course, the brunt
of
the bestiality was experienced mainly by the Indo-Guianese majority. 27)
The subsequent investigations
of the Wynn Parry Commission illustrated the national and international
dimensions
of these „racial conflicts“ within Guianese Nationalism. 28)
Under a revised
constitution,
whose salient feature was „proportional representation“, general
elections
were again held in December, 1964. The PPP won 24 seats (45.8% of the
votes,
the PNC 22 seats (40.5%) and the United Force 7 seats (12.4%). 29)
Burnham formed a coalition government
with Peter Stanislaus D’Aguiar’s United Force. In this way, a
„socialist-national‑capitalist“
government, headed by British Premier Burnham, appeared on the British
Guiana
political scene. PPP protests and boycotts of the London
„self‑government“
talks followed, but, all in vain; on May 26, 1966, having a monarchial
constitutional
status, Guyana was born. 30)
The Guyanese „Prince“ had introduced
the prologue to the Guyanese Machiavellian melodrama with
Rembrandtesque
overtures, and with Apartheid undertones.
During the 1963/1964
„race
riots“, at the eve of the general elections, Jessie Burnham, the sister
of
Forbes Burnham, decided to warn the Guianese about the subterranean
political
motives of her celebrated brother. Although individuals alone, surely,
do
not make history, very often, an individual leader in his social
practice
very accurately expresses and reproduces a specific trend of history,
the
deepest aspirations of certain social groups or classes. When his party
has
conquered State power, he becomes the impersenation of this historic
process.
As long as he represents and defends such class interests, he remains
in
power; if he betrays them, his historical role terminates. In the
character
and personality of Burnham, we can trace the egoistic, undemocratic,
unsocialistic,
megalomaniac political tendency which entered Guyanese social reality
ever
since the 1960s, and which is more alive than ever today. Furthermore
interfamily
quarrels are often emotional and biased, but when criticism becomes
verified
empirically and scientifically over two decades, then it is worth
paying
attention to it. For these reasons we will quote extensively some
passages
from it: Jessie Burnham’s brochure ,“ Beware My Brother Forbes”. 31)
Concerning Burnham’s
inhuman,
undemocratic political tactics, which reflect PNC methods in general,
Jessie
wrote:
„I have watched this
brilliant
brother use his brain to scheme, to plot to put friend against friend,
neighbour
against neighbour, and relative against relative. I have watched him
use
this one and that one and then quickly discard them when they have
served
their purpose. I have watched him, with this clever wit and charm,
manipulate
people like puppets on a string.“ 32)
About the
Machiavellian
„Prince“ and his political chess game, she related:
„His motto is the
personal
ends of power justify ANY means used to achieve them. His bible is The
Prince
by Machiavelli. And we the people should he come to power will be only
pawns
in his endless game of self‑advancement. Make no mistake about it, the
attraction
of political life for Forbes is the attainment of the power and the
glory.
The number of times he has ignored the offer of a coalition (by the
PPP)
supports this.“ 33)
How Burnham directed
his
party and Guyana ever since, she described:
„Today, he runs his
Party
like the way King Christopher once ran Haiti. ... Freedom, the liberty
of
speech, worship and the press. Would these freedoms continue under my
brother?
... That his love for personal power is so great he will trade anything
to
achieve it. That nothing is safe, no person, no liberty ... that stands
in
his way. ... Behind that jest, that charm, that easy oratory is a
certain
dark strain of cruelty which only surfaces when one of his vital
interests
is threatened. There are two Burnhams: the charming and the cruel. I
say
BEWARE of both“. 34)
Let us now surview the
economic
material base on which Guyana was granted political independence.
Besides,
let us circumscribe the economic measures taken by the Burnham‑D’Aguiar
coalition
government to transform that colonial‑capitalist structure. Certainly,
in
a realistic and pragmatic sense, even if Burnham had true socialist
goals,
within the context of historical realities of the late 1960s, he had no
chance
to perform economic miracles within a short period of time. At any
event,
to pursue his „love for personal power“, at first, he had to get rid of
his
troublesome coalition partner „by ANY means“. This he achieved in the
1968
general elections, when he „quickly discarded“ D’Aguiar, after he had
„served
his purpose“. However, one thing is crystal‑clear, whatever strategies
were
necessary to place Guyana on a viable economic footing, the last method
to
apply was to accept the Puerto Rican model of economic planning, which
characterised
the introduction of United States neocolonialism in the Carribean and
elsewhere during that epoch. Precisely this the „socialist ‑
national‑capitalist“ government
did, revealing the true historic tnendency of Guyanese economico
political
developments. The appearance forms of political opportunism, that is,
of
vacillation between „East“ and „West“ in the years to come, in no way
changes
the essence of this historical process.
British Colonialism
had
presented Guianese Nationalism with a healthy colonial-capitalist
socio‑economic
material structure. Since 1966, a new historical contradiction was
created:
World Imperialism versus PNC „National‑Socialism“, later also
euphemistically
called „Co‑operative Socialism“. The PNC Afro‑Guianese bureaucratic
elite
not only wanted to play an intermediate role within the context of
neo‑colonialism,
it also wanted the largest possible part of the imperialist spolia
opima.
Let us now demonstrate the extent of British and world imperialist
plunder,
already in the 1960s, with some statistical data.
The Demerara Electric
Company,
a Canadian subsidiary, with an original investment of G$ 500,000
anually
made, after tax reduction, an over 100% profit – G$ 500,000 to G$
750,000.
35)
In 1971, a document of the Guyana
Bauxite Co. (GUYBAU) claimed that the Demerara Bauxite Co. DEMBA, a
wholly‑owned
subsidiary of the Aluminium Company of Canada (ALCAN), which is again a
subsidiary
of the United Sates ALCOA, had taken out of Guyana „over half a billion
US
dollar worth of bauxite“, of which amount, Guyana „received only a bare
1.3%“
between 1918 and 1971. 36)
By 1969, ALCAN itself deployed
the equivalent of G$ 5 billion worth of assets and had an income of
over
G$ 2.6 billion. 37)
The last figure comprised over
five times of the GDP of Guyana in the late 1960s.
In accordance with the
Puerto
Rican Model and the economic plans of the „Alliance for Progress“ and
the
United Nations Economic Commission of Latin America (UCLA), Guyana
launched
its First Development Programme. Aided by other pro‑capitalist
advisers,
the G$ 300 Million Development Plan (1966‑1972) was drawn up by the
eminent
West‑Indian economist, Sir Arthur Lewis. Noteworthy, is that Burnham
and
D’Aguiar (the Minister of Finance) heavily depended on pro‑capitalist
economic
advisers such as W. Davenport, the US economic adviser to the Prime
Minister,
and Horst Bocklemann, the West German Governor of the Central Bank of
Guyana.
38)
This plan was essentially based
an a strategy of „industrialisation by invitation“ and oriented at
attracting
foreign capital investments by offering very favourable incentives. In
reality,
it was aimed at neglecting industry and agriculture, because three
quarters
of the expenditure was directed at infrastructural developments, to
build
roads, to supply electricity, etc. 39)
In general, the Government’s
economic policy towards the major industries ‑ sugar, rice and bauxite
‑
remained essentially pro‑capitalistic, anti‑nationalistic and
conservative.
In any case, to have nationalised these industries in the 1960s would
have
meant economic hari‑kiri, in due respect of the demands of the PPP and
the
Ratoon Group 40)
for such an early unpragmatic
move. If nationalisation should be one of the material conditions to
introduce
socialism, then, at least, all the material and intellectual conditions
should
be existent, to make nationalisation itself possible. Many
„Third‑World“
countries had to learn this maxim of dialectics the very hard way.
In accordance with his
own
plans, Burnham signed a 25‑year agreement with Reynolds Metals Company
to
exploit bauxite. Besides, his Government agreed to freeze income tax
and
royalties during that period. In the sugar industry, Government shares
were
restricted to a mere 5%, which practically gave Booker Brothers
McConnell
a monopoly to direct economic life. Even where overseas marketing was
concerned,
the US trading company, Cornnel Rice and Sugar Company, dominated the
commercial
field. 41)
The above selected
data
should suffice to elucidate the economic state of affairs and the
direction
of Guyanese economic processes in the late 1960s. Consequently,
Guyana’s
„self‑goverrmant“ was based on a very slippery imperialist platform,
its
first development plan necessitated the mobilisation of G$ 245 million
from
foreign capitalist resources. This programme had nothing to do with
economic
aid from „socialist“ sources, in fact, deliberately, relations to the
„East“
were reduced to the least possible. This „socialist“ utopia, to receive
material
help from the ex‑colonial and imperialist masters, was only negligibly
realised.
By 1968, mainly because the United Force was still a desirable obstacle
to
the PNC’s squandermania, half of the G$ 62 million private investments
did
come from overseas capitalist sources. Also, the USA, the UK, UN
agencies
and the World Bank supplied G$ 140 million in economic aid, but, this
sum
was not enough to boost the economic development plan, and was not
sufficient
to establish a viable economy. 42)
The logical result of this PNC-UF
economic policy of gambling with capital of their „opponents“, was that
Guyana
became indebted to the very historical sources which had granted it
„flag“
independence. Guyana’s foreign debt increased remarkably: from G$ 107
million
in 1961 to G$ 319 million by 1971. 43)
It will surpass the G$ 2.5 billion
mark in the early 1980s.
On the other hand, the
success
of the economic plan also depended on increased production and
productivity. Concerning the latter, where
an Indo‑Guyanese majority
progressively is being thrown out of political life and economic
decision‑making,
productivity surely will not flourish. As already mentioned before, as
workers,
they dominate the important sugar and rice sectors of the economy,
Furthermore,
it depended on direct and indirect taxation. The latter, for example,
rose
from G$ 2.79 million in 1966 to G$ 15.1 million in 1969. 44)
Guyana rapidly developed to
one of the world’s heaviest tax‑earners; by 1984, the budget had very
little left to tax anymore. 45)
That prevented the above factors to „rescue“ the economy from
continuous and continuative decomposition, was what the application of
the Puerto Rican model had generated chronic unemployment,
especially among the youth, which formed a significant part of the
active
working population. In general, unemployment rose to about 30%, and to
about
50% among the youth workers. 46)
One of the factors responsible
for this socio‑economic degeneration, was that agriculture and industry
were
neglected.
The fall in production
and
productivity, the skyrocketting of cost‑of‑living prices, the
escalation
of unemployment, the increase of corruption and criminality and the
acceleration of direct and indirect taxation, all these, contributed to
the early collapse of the First Development Plan. On a social level, to
avoid starvation and malnutrition, which would have generated „labour
disturbances“ and „race riots“,
the Government had to increase its food importation bill ‑ a capitalist
anomaly
in a country as rich as Guyana in food resources. 47)
It rose from G$ 25 million in
1960 to G$ 38 million in 1970. 48)
Already a year after its introduction,
the programme had to suffer a devaluation of the Guyanese dollar; one
of
the earliest consequences of PNC betrayal to the goals of true
anti‑colonialism
was to establish immediately firm ties with the International Monetary
Fund
(IMF). What this meant, after the introduction of „co‑operative
socialism“
in the 1970s, we will see later. By 1984, even the IMF refused to help
the
bankrupt PNC policies and economy. 49)
By 1971, the development programme
completely broke down, and the PNC Government decided to embark on the
omnibenevolent
„socialist“ Second Development Plan, the Feed, Clothe And House the
Nation
(FCHN) Programme, 1972‑1976. 50)
Let us just briefly
summarise
what this economic bankruptcy reflected on the politic level. The
United
Force, Burnham’s coalition partner, represented Iberio-Guyanese
national
capitalist interests, which contradicted PNC bureaucratic elitist
economic
aspirations. Finance Minister D’Aguiar had introduced legal measures to
enable
his national capitalist class to invest abroad; he himself had
„Guyanised“
his huge concern, Banks DIH Ltd., which mainly concentrated in the
production
of beer, liquor and non‑alcoholic beverages. Thus, a non‑Afro‑Guianese
national class was gaining a stronghold on the Guyanese economy. By
„ANY means“, this politico‑economic process had to be stopped, and its
tendency had to be directed
by the PNC State, towards „co‑operative socialism“. Burnham made use of
the
very first opportunity to realise his political goal. By means of
fraudulent
methods and massive „rigging”, that is, inter alia, by padding of the
electoral
role, by proxy voting of the dead, the under‑age and phantom voters, in
the
1968 general elections, his PNC won the absolute majority, by obtaining
30
seats out of 53. 51)
The road was now open to inaugurate
the Co‑operative Republic of Guyana on February 23, 1970, with Forbes
Burnham
as its first Prime Minister. 52)
Let us summarise the
economic
realities of Guyana between „independence“ and „republic“, in order to
give
a material background to the political move towards „nationalisation”
in
the 1970s. According to a Labour Force Survey of 1965, and other
statistical
data, supplied by Ved P. Duggal, in 1966, Guyana’s per capita GDP (at
factor
cost, and in current prices) had risen to G$ 515 (1972: G$ 1 = US$
0.50).
53)
More than 53% of this GDP was
generated by sugar, mining (mostly bauxite), distribution and
government
sectors. 54)
Between 1960 and 1964, the average
rate of growth of per capita GDP „has been about 3.5% per year“. 55)
In 1968 (the year of the conquest
of State power by the PNC), compared to 1967, the GDP increased in real
terms
by about 5%. Over the next years, it increased at a similar rate, and
it
reached G$ 500 million in 1971 (when „nationalisation“ began). 56)
1972‑1973, real growth of production
stagnated, and in 1974, an upward trend was registered again. 57)
A PNC Government booklet confirmed
the evolution of this economic process in the pre-Republican period:
„Economic
development in Guyana during the years 1967-1971 has been sustained at
an
appreciably high rate, Gross Domestic Product at current factor cost
rose
from G$ 378. 5 million in 1967 to G$ 412. 2 million in 1968; in 1969,
GDP
rose to G$ 445. 9 million, by 1970 GDP was G$ 472. 9 million and in
1971
the GDP reached the half billion mark (G$ 500 million)“. 58)
Throughout the period 1967‑1971, the real growth rate of the GDP
„averaged a minimum of five per cent, per annum“. 59)
What do the above
figures
signify, in the light of what has been stated earlier, i.e., in
relation
to productivity and production? It simply means that the ratio of GDP
to
total labour force was negligent. The real income growth had not kept
pace
with population growth during that period. As mentioned before, the
„healthy
colonial‑capitalist structure“, which Guyana had inherited, retained
the
economic weakness of all „developing“ countries, that is, potentially
to
stagnate. Duggal: „The ratio of GDP to total labour force was about G$
1700
in 1965, G$ 1652 in 1966, G$ 1663 in 1967, G$ 1660 in 1968, and G$ 1666
in
1969“. 60)
During that period,
the
Guyanese economy was dependent on two major capital‑intensive sectors,
the
sugar and bauxite industries. 61)
As stated already, they were again dependent on foreign trade and
capital. The 1966‑1972 development plan
generated an asymmetric development between agriculture, industry and
infrastructure.
Consequently, it caused an even more unbalanced economic process. The
entrance
of British Guiana into CARIFTA, in 1965, did not alleviate this
problem,
on the contrary, it furthered US „equal partnership“ interests. All
these
have to be seen in the context of Guyanese application of the Puerto
Rican
model in 1966, when it had already collapsed in Puerto Rico at the
beginning
of the 1960s.
After Guyana became a
co‑operative
republic in 1970, one of the first measures which the PNC government
adopted,
was to „own and control“ the country’s national resources by means of
„nationalisation“.
As we will see, this concretely meant accumulation of State capital to
finance
the interests of the rising PNC bureaucratic national‑capitalist elite.
In 1970, Burnham attended the Non‑Aligned Summit Conference in Lusaka,
Zambia:
He made use of the opportunity to make a „foreign policy safari“, to
study
„African Socialism“, co‑operativism and „nationalisation“ in Zambia,
Tanzania
and Uganda. From Obote’s party, he borrowed the political slogan: One
People,
One Nation, One Destiny. 62)
Within the new
contradiction
which developed, that is, PNC State capitalism versus Word Imperialism,
Burnham
introduced his „socialist“ ideology, an appearance form, to veil the
essence
of his capitalist, oppressive and exploitative interests.
Opportunistically,
he developed his own version of „African Socialism“ and gave it a
camouflaging, non‑aligned, anti‑imperialist foreign policy.
„Nationalisation“ was the economic
tool to give veracity to his noble „cooperative socialist“ ideals. Let
us
now elucidate how a „purchase agreement“ was masked as
„nationalisation“ of
DEMBA, the Guyanese subsidiary of the Aluminium Company of Canada (
ALCAN
).
Having studied Kenneth
Kaunda’s
nationalisation (majority shares control), the PNC suggested government
„majority participation“ to the ALCAN representatives of the Guyana
bauxite industry. They were not fascinated, and offered at most „equal
partnership“. However,
let us briefly illustrate Guyana’s bauxite industry, in order to
demonstrate
its relevance for the Guyanese economy, and why the PNC government
began
its nationalisation drive with ALCAN.
Guyana’s bauxite
industry
dates back to 1916, when Bain Mackenzie began operations at Three
Friends
on the east bank of the Demerara River. 63)
At the time of Guyana’s „independence“,
already two US bauxite mining companies were active in the country:
Demerara
Bauxite Company (DEMBA) and Reynolds (Guyana) Mines Ltd. DEMBA, the
largest
mining company, was a wholly‑owned subsidiary of ALCAN, which again was
a
Canadian subsidiary of the huge US multi‑national, ALCOA. By 1971,
Guyana
was producing dried (metal grade) bauxite, calcined bauxite and
alumina.
At that time, Guyana ranked fourth among the world’s bauxite producers;
it
supplied almost 90% of the world’s calcined bauxite. 64)
The latter was the most important
foreign exchange and profit‑earner. Together with sugar and rice
exports,
it formed one of the main pillars of the vulnerable, unstable, Guyanese
neocolonial
capitalist economy. For example, in 1972, bauxite production was
contributing
to just under 20% of Guyana’s GNP and to about 40% of foreign exchange
earnings.
In an „Address to the
Nation“
of February 23, 1971, President Burnham gave the following alarming
figures
of ALCAN bauxite exploitation: „At this stage it is apposite to note
that
ALCAN in 1969 deployed the equivalent of G$ 5 billion worth of assets
and
had an income of over G$ 2.6 billion…. Guyana over the last fifty odd
years
received less than 3% of the profits accruing from the exploitation of
her
bauxite“. 65)
In April, 1970, at the 13th
Annual Congress of the PNC, its leadership „enunciated the basic and
fundamental
principle of ‘Ownership and Control’ of our resources for and by
Guyanese“.
66)
A year later, on March 1, 1971,
the Guyana parliament by a majority vote of 48 to 3 passed the „Bauxite
Nationalisation
Act“. 67)
It is relevant to note that
between 1966 and 1970, in general, the PNC had opposed nationalisation,
as a result of its pro-imperialist foreign policy. It was the PPP, in
line with Soviet foreign policy, which had demanded nationalisation.
Later, when the
PPP gave birth to its negation, beginning with the genesis of the
Ratoon
Group (the original nucleus of the WPA in the late 1960s) 68),
other extraparliamentary groups,
with a Maoist orientation, voiced similar economic demands. Around
1970,
this „nationalisation“ fever, coming from the opposition, favoured
Burnham
in the actualisation of his State‑capitalist dreams. This is the reason
why
so many non‑PNC parliamentarians supported the passing of the
above‑mentioned
act.
Thus, on July 15,
1971,
the ALCAN plant at Linden (renamed after Linden F.S. Burnham) was
nationalised
and the Guyana Bauxite Company (GUYBAU) was born. The mutual agreement
revealed
the purchasing essence of this formal „socialist“ move: „The government
of
Guyana will pay to ALCAN a sum of G$ 107 million (US$ 53 million), over
a
period of no more than 20 years with interest at 6% subject to
withholding
tax“. 69)
The PPP commented: „... the
agreed price was US$ 53.5 million with 6% interest (Government figures
of
compensation). Figures from other sources have disclosed that the
amount
was higher. The nationalised bauxite complex will cost the Guyanese
people
G$ 160 million with a repayment period of 20 years. In addition the
government
borrowed US$ 8 million from Chase Manhattan Bank to help in the
nationalisation
of ALCAN“. 70)
It follows that the PPP and
other oppositional groups had favoured nationalisation, but not the PNC
compensation type. As already indicated, State control of principal
sectors of the economy or even State ownership of main industries does
not necessarily mean the introduction
of socialism. It can very well be utilised to consolidate elitist
bureaucratic
class rule. 71)
Historical events
confired
that the „nationalisation“ of ALCAN, in reality, did not cause any
anxiety
among the representatives of either Reynolds or Booker Bros. It was by
no
means a rupture with foreign capital. For example, GUYBAU’s selling
agent
for bauxite on the world market, Philipp Bros., with its head‑quarters
in
New York, is a wholly‑owned subsidiary of Engelhard Minerals and
Chemical
Corporation (USA), which again is a subsidiary company of the
multi-national
giant, Anglo American Corporation. In 1970, Engelhard had total assets
of
US$ 624,498,000 and its net sales and operating revenues amounted to
US$
1,473,656,000. 72)
The marketing of this company
was Guyana’s bauxite selling agent.
Since 1971, a real PNC
„cooperative
socialist” nationalisation epidemic broke out. In 1972, the ownership
of
Guyana Timbers Ltd. passed into PNC Government hands. In 1973 the
Government
„assumed ownership, for housing and agriculture, of all unused and idle
lands
owned or possessed by the sugar companies“. 73)
In 1975, the nationalisation
of Reynolds (1.1.1975) and of Jessel‑Holdings (26.5.1975) followed. In
1976,
Booker McConnell (26.5.1976) and Sprastans (1.1.1976) had to believe in
all
these „socialist“ illusions. 74)
By then, the PNC had declared
itself as a „socialist vanguard party“, had developed an ideology of
„Marxism-Leninism“,
and had declared its „paramountcy over the Government“. 75)
In the next section,
we
will expound the political acme of „co‑operative socialism“, 1970‑1976,
by
making special reference to its Declaration of Sophia (1974), its
Second
Development Plan, 1972‑1976, and its foreign policy, generated from
this
national politico‑economic base. We will conclude this part, by
summarising
Guyana’s foreign policy during the period prior to the Co‑operative
Republic.
Of significance is to note how Guyanese political processes affected
national
economic developments, and vice versa, and how both determined foreign
policy.
Special reference will be made to the Venezuela‑Guyana border conflict
which
is an example par excellence of PNC opportunistic political manoeuvres.
Guyana’s
foreign policy between 1966 and 1970 was mainly dictated by her PNC
Minister
for External Affairs, Shridath Surendranath „Sonny“ Ramphal. 76)
Already in the pre‑„independence“
period, he had been instrumental in the negotiations to form CARIFTA on
May
1, 1965. In 1969, he expressed the general trend of Guyanese foreign
policy,
which was moving from an open pro‑imperialist position towards
„non‑alignment“:
„... our external relations must be guided by a policy of
non‑alignment.
Non‑alignment, not in sterile withdrawal from international
opinion‑making,
but in an avoidance of becoming a mere apperdage to international power
‑
in retention of a right of choice and whatever freedom of action is
possible
in a world not generous to freedom“. 77)
However, Ramphal’s personal
views about foreign policy and Guyanese political realities did not
synchronise
very well.
Nonetheless as early
as
June 1965, Burnham „had laid the cornerstone“ to Guyana’s future
foreign
policy when „he promulgated the stand that Guyana shall be no man’s
satellite;
shall be no man’s slave’’. 78)
In March 1976, he was more explicit
when he declared in parliament that Guyana „shall be pawn of neither
East
nor West“, and that „neither of the super powers or great blocs can
depend
on automatic support“. 79)
With one example we will demonstrate
the political reality of this non‑aligned „sweet‑talk“. Not even a year
earlier,
on May 26, 1966, the US base at Timehri „was returned to the people of
Guyana“;
about the secret military pact concerning United States use of the
Atkinson
Airfield, which was signed by Burnham himself, no word was lost. 80)
Inter alia, the secret pact
contained „non‑aligned“ privileges such as: „the armed forces of the
United
States of America are authorised to overfly Guyana and to use the
Timehri
Airport on a temporary basis, for unlimited periods of time and as
often
as they wish“. 81)
This right was granted unconditionally,
negating the principle of „non‑alignment“ as expressed by Ramphal and
Burnham.
We could cite many more examples of Guyanese political verbalism and
wishful‑thinking;
however, within the general context of what follows, these will become
apparent.
Certainly, in the
pro‑imperialist
period, 1966‑1970, latent political moves towards „non‑alignment“ were
in
process. By February 1972, Guyana did have a complement of 11 missions
abroad.
Among them were missions at the United Nations, in Venezuela, Suriname
and
Jamaica. At the same time, she established diplomatic relations with
about
30 other countries, among them were the U.S.S.R., Israel, India,
Brazil,
Dominican Republic and Zambia. Of course, apart from this major
„non‑alignment“
thrust, cordial relations were established with the U.S.A., Canada,
U.K.,
Japan, and Federal Republic of Germany. 82)
Basically, however, during the 1966–1970 period, Guyana had taken „a
virulent anti-communist, anti‑Soviet and anti‑Cuba position”. 83)
She supported US foreign policy
on the People’s Republic of China, which ranged from strong opposition,
to
a „two‑Chinas“ position, to an eventual support of China’s admision to
the
United Nations. 84)
Already in 1965, this tendency
was evident when she defended the US landing of 45,000 marines in the
Dominican
Republic. Concerning „Vietnam policy“ she supported the US line that
all
troops should be withdrawn. On the other hand, although Guyana was
hosted by the People´s Republic of China in 1971, trade and cultural
relations remained
negligible. Only on June 27, 1972, officially diplomatic relations were
established.
85)
Concerning diplomatic relations with the USSR, which exist since 1971,
initially, they remained merely formal and nominal. 86)
Only towards 1973, diplomatic and other relations were extended‑ to
other „socialist“ countries like Cuba,
Yugoslavia, Democratic Republic of Germany, Rumania and Poland. About
the vacillating foreign policy, we will comment more in the following
section.
The history of the
Guyana‑Venezuelan
limitrofe problem, from its origin until the Geneva Agreement in 1966,
has
been expounded in various scientific publications. 87)
On the basis of the acceptance
of the controversial 1899 Paris Arbitral Award, in 1932, Venezuela,
Great
Britain and Brazil had fixed the trijunction point at which the borders
of
Venezuela, British Guiana and Brazil meet, on the peak of Mount
Roraima.
88)
On February 8, 1944, one of
the members of the United States/Venezuela Boundary Commission of
1896‑97,
Severo Mallet‑Prevost, a relatively junior lawyer on the Venezuelan
team,
dictated a memorandum. 89)
In it, he „accused his deceased
colleagues of entering into an illicit political deal and of
deliberately
coming to a false decision“ 90)
to the disadvantage of Venezuela.
This occurred about a month after he had received the Venezuelan Award
‑
the Order of the Liberator. In his memorandum, he stated that the
unanimous
final decision of 1899 „was unjust to Venezuela and deprived her of
very
extensive and important territory to which, in my opinion, Great
Britain
had not the shadow of a right“. 91)
This document led to
the
re‑opening of the Guyana‑Venezuelan border dispute at the beginning of
the
1960s. However, in Feburary, 1966, while British Guiana was still a
British
Colony, the Geneva Agreement, was signed by British Guiana, Venezuela
and
Great Britain. 92)
It established a Mixed Commission
of Venezuelan and Guianese representatives to seek „satisfactory
solutions
for the practical settlement of the controversy between Venezuela and
the
United Kingdom which has arisen as the result of the Venezuelan
contention
that the Arbitral Award of 1899 about the frontier between British
Guiana
and Venezuela is null and void“. 93)
In September 1966, the
new
South American state, Guyana, was admitted to the United Nations, at a
time
when the above‑mentioned commission had its second sitting. However, in
the
same Month, the „Ankoko Affair“ occurred. Ankoko is an island situated
is
the Cuyuni border river. Its eastern half was declared Guianese
territory
by the Boundary Commission of 1905. 94)
Ramphal protested in front of
the United Nations by declaring: „Venezuela brazenly occupied the
Guyana
half of the island of Ankoko, an island of strategic importance in one
of
the border rivers between our countries. .... To compound the
aggression,
Venezuelan armed forces have established upon the island an airstrip
capable
of accommodating military aircraft and have turned the island itself
into
a military fortress“. 95)
Prime Mister Burnham on radio
admonished the Guyanese to remain calm. He told them that „not a blade
of
grass“ would be conceded to the Venezuelans. 96)
The historic truth is that,
since nearly two decades, inumerous blades of Venezuelan grass are
covering
the island. 97)
This Venezuelan „aggression“
suited Burnham’s future plans to irradicate PNC „paramountcy“ and
dictatorship.
He converted political folly into militarisation of Guyana.
The Rupununi, Guyana’s
southernmost
district, lies near the Brazilian and Venezuelan boundaries. Its major
industry
was cattle‑ranching, which was then carried on in the south by the
Rupununi
Development Company, and in the north by two families of mixed
European‑Amerindian
ancestry. At that time, about 10,000 Amerindians, in scattered
villages,
populated the region. Some of them worked as ranch hands for the
above‑mentioned farmers; others were occupied with balata collecting
for sale.
The „insurrection“
originated
because some private ranchers feared that the future PNC government
would
refuse to renew their grazing rights. A small number of Amerindians
also
shared their anxiety. These rebels killed six persons, including five
policemen.
Within two days, a contingent of the newly‑established Guyana Defence
Force
(1965) crushed the rebellion. Some 70 Amerindians were rumoured to have
been
killed in this agressive military campaign, 98)
which was titulated as a „follow up operation to purge the rats out of
their holes“. 99)
However, the „leaders“ managed
to flee; instead of them,“several“ persons were arrested, and ten of
them
put to trial in Georgetown. Before Justice Arthur Chung (later
president
of Guyana), seven were acquitted, and the jury failed to come to a
verdict
concerning the remaining three. Eventually, on June 2, 1970, the
director
of public Prosecution entered a nolle prosequi in favour of them, and
they
were set free. 100)
What concerns us, in
relation
to foreign policy, is that the „ringleaders“ of the „insurrection“ fled
to
Brazil and Venezuela. This action caused international reactions which
affected
Guyana’s relations to her neighbours. The rebels claimed that they were
oppressed
by the Guyana regime and consequently wanted to set up an independent
Rupununi
Republic. Twenty‑nine of them are supposed to have obtained political
asylum
in Venezuela. 101)
The fact of the matter is
that the PNC-UF government had neglected the Amerindian peoples. The
subsequent
PNC regime manipulated and ignored them. Consequently, a coincidence of
social interests developed between them and the ranchers, which
eventually annoyed
the Guyana administration.
However, this incident
also
reflected the contradiction within the PNC-UF coalition, and the
attitudes
of both opposing partners vis‑a‑vis the border dispute. Madam Hart, a
candidate
of the UF, declared on Venezuelan television that she was the
„President“
of Essequibo, and on the basis of such untruths, she asked Venezuela to
intervene on her behalf. To drive her point home, she utilised the
political „sore‑points“ of that epoch: „She warned Venezuelans then
that the PNC was communist and
that one day they might very well have their ‘Bay of Pigs’ in the
Essequibo“.
102)
Ramphal, by declaring the
above as another „violation“ of the Geneva Agreement, countered by
arguing
that, already in 1966, Venezuelan diplomatic personnel in Guyana were
engaged
in clandestine subversive activities among „Guyana’s indigenous
Amerindian community“. The expelled Second Secretary of the Venezuelan
Embassy in Georgetown
„was responsible for organising and financing a secret meeting of
Amerindian
tribes in Guyana and attempting to induce them to express support for
the
Venezuelan claim“. 103)
In addition, he accused Venezuela
of „political and economic aggression“. She had secured „the exclusion
of
Guyana from the Organisation of American States“, and had prevented a
signatory
to the Treaty of Tlateloco ‑ the Latin American Denuclearisation
Treaty.
Furthermore, he rebuked Venezuela for having anrounced to the world, in
the
London Times of 15th June, 1968, „its refusal to recognise any
concessions
granted by the Government of Guyana to companies operating in the area
of
Guyana which Venezuela lays claim“. 104)
Also, on June 9th, 1968, a
Venezuelan decree purported to annex and to assert sovereign right
„over
a 9 ‑ mile belt of sea extending to within three miles of the coast of
Guyana
and contiguous to Guyana’s territorial waters“. 105)
Such an aggressive political atmosphere by no means favoured
„satisfactory solutions“ or any „practical settlement“ of the border
conflict ‑ on the contrary, progressively they contributed
to the final stale‑mate of 1970.
All these political
events
enabled Burnham to play his anti‑communist „trump“ card: his revelation
of
Cuban ‑ M.I.R. involvement in a „plot“ to overthrow his government. The
reactionary
essence of the „Beria Plot“ is a remarkable example of Burnham’s
perennial
summersaults in foreign policy. It was Burnham’s last overt
anti‑socialist
rigmarole, in spite of PNC claims that it had been „socialist“ ab ovo. 106)
Let us give some verbatim examples
of Burnham’s views, concerning his relations to the Soviet Union and
Cuba
between 1962 and 1968: „... the Cubans,
who Castro
had given no vote do not have a vote here and I do not propose to give
them“.
(Burnham, 1962) 107)
“... this is no time to advertise
that you want the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to come and take over
your
economy ... a small nation l
