PANDEMONIUM
SUNDAY TIMES
No.
603.
ENGLISH & SPANISH:
** INTEAD OF
AN EDITORIAL:
Virtual Dreaming versus Stark Reality
(22nd August, 2002.)
IN PLACE OF AN EDITORIAL:
Virtual Dreaming versus Stark Reality
By Franz
J. T. Lee
http://www.franz-lee.org/files/chatnotes00030.html
22nd August, 2002.
In Vietnam in 1972 there was a hearts and minds program called chieu hoi to entice the population in the south to rally to the government. The late Gavin Young of the Observer quipped: “I think the Americans have bitten off more than they can chieu hoi .” Is this the case with Iraq if, whatever happens in Baghdad, liberation turns to occupation and resistance?
To lose the hearts and minds, which the Americans have surely done so far in Iraq, would surely be to lose the war, whatever the strategic results. But don’t whisper “Vietnam”, and certainly “quagmire”, the word with which the Iraqis daily taunt the Americans. To do so in print has invited the reflex denial that the topography — desert versus jungle — is different and not good for guerrilla war; that Vietnam took 10 years to lose and we’ve been here two weeks. One historian wrote last week that the Iraqis were not “politicized as the Vietnamese were by the Vietcong”, a startling observation given the evidence of recent days. Nationalism, patriotism and fatwas from the Arab world are surely enough. Iraqi strategists, according to one Arab editor, study Vietnam constantly. And they talk of it too. Not only will 100 Bin Ladens be unleashed by this struggle, they say, but “100 Vietnams”.
“Let our cities be our swamps and our buildings our jungles,” Tariq Aziz told the Institute of Strategic Studies before war began. On Friday Iraq’s Information Minister Mohammed Saeed Al-Sahaf talked of turning Iraq into “another Indochina”. Has Baghdad become a mini Ho Chi Minh trail of hidden tunnels and arsenals?
George C Scott, as Gen. Patton in the eponymous film, hisses: “Rommel, you sonofabitch, I read your book”. The key book for the Iraqis was written by Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap, the brilliant architect of the war against the French and the Americans. It was published in English in 1961, under the title People’s War, People’s Army, long before the US war in Vietnam hotted up. Though full of partyspeak, it shows how easy it is to hold up and demoralise a hugely superior army that has a long supply convoy. Giap exploited what he called “the contradictions of the aggressive colonial war”. The invaders have to fan out and operate far from their bases. When they deploy, said Giap, “their broken-up units become easy prey”. First harass the enemy, “rotting” away his rear and reserves, forcing him to deploy troops to defend bases and perimeters.
“Is the enemy strong?” wrote Giap. “One avoids him. Is he weak? One attacks him.” There will never be enough troops to hold down the scattered guerrilla forces. Gen. William Westmoreland, commander of US forces in Vietnam, estimated that he would have needed 2 million troops to “pacify” the country. At the peak of the war he had half that number. You can apply the principle to Baghdad or the country beyond — the topography matters less than the principle. Commanders talk of their puzzlement at Republican Guard units “melting away” after the onslaught of last week. Are they preparing a trap?
It was astonishing to read of the surprise on the part of the military at the Iraqis’ methods. The commander of the Desert Rats said that their “terror tactics” were “outside the rules of war”, although anyone who has attended a war knows there aren’t any rules. Hue was the last pitched battle fought by the Americans during the 1968 Tet offensive. In that battle, 5,000 Vietcong infiltrators climbed out of their civilian clothes in the city to reveal their North Vietnamese uniforms. Gen. Westmoreland complained that Tet “was characterized by treachery and deceitfulness” — the same outrageous methods Bush speaks about today.
The Americans were surprised and outraged by the Vietnamese tactics right to the end, consistently underestimating the North Vietnamese Army’s strength and determination. I remember the shock in 1972 when the North Vietnamese launched a fierce barrage far from its bases with deeply dug-in 130mm guns south of the demilitarized zone. Giap had stockpiled massive underground arsenals.
The Iraq campaign has swiftly changed from a “hearts and minds” operation of liberation to one of winning the war. The Anglo-American forces have not won the cooperation of the local population that is so vital for military-political control. From the Iraqi point of view, since you can’t win, the only real weapon is the demoralization of the enemy, keeping the war going as long as possible and uniting the population against them. Mark Franchetti reported vividly last weekend on frightened Marines shooting up any taxi that moved, describing the fresh-faced soldiers he had met a few days ealier turning into scared, demoralized killers — echoes again of the Vietnam era.
Giap wanted to wage a protracted guerrilla war of attrition and mount a parallel political offensive aimed at the US democratic system, which would not bear for ever a long, inconclusive war. The Iraqis are doing the same. What took years to build up in the US during the Vietnam War — skepticism and finally widespread opposition — could happen in just weeks with the help of 24-hour television. Now the actual speed and success of the war will come down to whether the Americans are prepared to kill civilians more or less indiscriminately, as Saddam does and Giap did before him. If it is a question of televised bodybags versus civilians, the civilians will have to go.
Finally, there is the Giap maxim: “War without politics is like a a tree without a root.” At the moment, the coalition politics stinks. It is impossible for Rumsfeld, and perhaps also Tony Blair, to understand how insulting it is to be told what “liberation” is by a superpower you have reason to distrust. The doctrine forgets how instructed Iraqis are with a deep sense of their history, as were the Vietnamese and as are the Palestinians, now coming to fight in Iraq because they fear they may be next.
I remember, too, in Vietnam in 1972 the anger among the South Vietnamese — even when facing defeat — at being denied a hand in their own destiny. The sentiment was eloquently put by one Iraqi in Basra last week: “Even if I do not support Saddam, I do not want the invasion. They want to change the system but this is not the way. This way there will be only death, the death of children and women.”
Maybe the Iraqis who simply want to defend their country out of patriotism should be taken at their word; that Baghdad is indeed the first quagmire they advertise. It can’t be besieged because that would lose any final support for the US/UK cause. In house-to-house fighting it will take, according to one military expert, a battalion to clear one office block; the battle could last many weeks or even months. If air strikes are used, it will kill many civilians and wreck any last hope of cooperation.
“What if they get to Baghdad and nobody’s home?” asks Dan Plesch, senior researcher at the Royal United Services Institute, “if they’ve all melted away to the towns set in the marshes of the Tigris?” With or without Saddam, the guerrilla war then extends to the country beyond and then perhaps to the whole Arab world, whose united desire at the moment, according to Egypt’s leading newspaper, is to see the “invincible” US defeated, in whatever cause.
(James Fox reported from Vietnam for the Sunday Times in the early 1970s. He is the author of White Mischief and The Langhorne Sisters
JamesFox@compuserve.com)
Saddam calls on Iraqis to save Baghdad
as
US tanks enter capital
(AFP), Khaleej Times, 6 April 2003
In a speech read on television on his behalf by Information Minister Mohammad Said al-Sahhaf Saturday, Saddam told Iraqis Baghdad was still theirs to rescue. Sahhaf told reporters Iraq had won back Baghdad’s main airport with a deadly assault on US troops that included suicide attacks, a claim quickly denied by the Americans.
Sahhaf later told Abu Dhabi satellite TV that Iraqi forces had killed more than 300 US troops in heavy fighting around the city’s international airport.
AFP correspondents saw dozens of Iraqi military vehicles burning on the streets after a battle near the road to the airport, which US Central Command said was “secure” and in coalition hands a day after its capture.
US commanders said 30 tanks penetrated deep into the capital and had come under rifle fire and attack by rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). US officers said an American tank commander was shot dead and estimated some 1,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed.
But Baghdadis could find no sign of US troops in the capital later in the day.
AFP correspondents chased down leads and rumors as they came in, darting from the campus of Baghdad University to Saddam Bridge over the Tigris River to Eagles Square in the southwest of the capital but each time turned up empty-handed.
Several hours after the dash through the capital, burning Iraqi armored vehicles testified to clashes with the Americans, whose tanks were long gone.
“The enemy has concentrated all its forces against Baghdad, which has weakened its power in other parts of Iraq,” Saddam said in the address. “You must now weaken them (further), deepen their wounds and deprive them of what they have taken of your land, even though it is negligible, in order to reduce their chances and accelerate their defeat.”
He added that Iraqis should “increase the number of attacks and go all out at the enemy to destroy them, following the orders in the written plans they have received.
“What has happened in Baghdad up until now is rather less than your Baghdad can put up with and God will protect it, even if it will have to cope with an even heavier burden.
“The enemy is lost (if they) believe they can heal the wounds they have already suffered by trying to attack Bagdad.”
Sahhaf insisted victory was near for Iraq.
“We have defeated them, in fact we have crushed them,” he said of US and British forces. “We have pushed them outside the whole area of the airport.”
He said suicide attacks had been launched on the American forces, part of “not conventional” combat methods he promised Friday.
US Central Command said the fight for Baghdad was “far from finished.”
Coalition combat aircraft began flying all-day patrols over Baghdad to provide close air support for US ground forces probing the capital, said Lieutenant General T. Michael Moseley, commander of the US-led air campaign. In central Baghdad, Iraqis staged a victory march. Convoys of cars, including police cruisers with wailing sirens, navigated the streets as motorists waved Iraqi flags and fired assault rifles, honked and flashed the “V” for victory sign.
At the Al-Yarmuk hospital near the scene of the fighting, ambulances and civilian minibuses have continuously brought in wounded soldiers since the US onslaught on the airport began late Thursday.
Artillery fire was heard several hours after the engagement on the edge of the Dora and Yarmuk neighborhoods in southwest Baghdad, about 10 kilometers (six miles) from the center.
“The fighting lasted from five to eight o’clock this morning (0100 GMT to 0400 GMT),” said Kamal, an electrician from the Yarmuk district.
“It was hell. We were on a battlefield.”
Iraqi army trucks, armored personnel carriers as well as jeeps mounted with anti-aircraft gunners were abandoned, some burning and others smoking on the main road leading to the Dora electricity station and nearby side streets. Baghdad came in for another day of bombing, as allied warplanes struck the city center and southern outskirts and loud explosions shook downtown high-rises.
At least two massive explosions were heard in central Baghdad just after midnight (2000 GMT). Iraqi artillery fire was later heard in the southern suburbs of the city.
Earlier Saturday night, a missile
struck the Tigris next to Saddam’s main presidential palace, which has
repeatedly been hit by bombs or missiles since the United States and
Britain launched war on March 20 with the aim of toppling him.
http://www.aljazeerah.info/6%20news/Saddam%20calls%20on%20Iraqis%20to%20
save%20Baghdad%20as%20US%20tanks%20enter%20capital%20aljazeerah.info.htm
Isaac Bigio
Servicio
Informativo "alai-amlatina"
Un
viejo pensamiento militar consiste en recomendar a las fuerzas débiles
que se enfrentan a un enemigo poderoso el esquivar los combates frontales
o en emboscar desde la periferia para ir minando el centro de poder. Basándose
en añejas enseñanzas bélicas chinas, Mao acuñó
la estrategia: 'guerra popular prolongada del campo a la ciudad.' Su tesis
de cercar las urbes desde el agro inspiró a una serie de movimientos,
algunos victoriosos (Vietnam) y otros derrotados (Senderismo peruano).
En el caso iraquí Hussein ha creado su propia variante. Sus
fuerzas se repliegan de las áreas rurales para concentrarse en las
urbes mayores. La mayor potencia de la historia es la que está cercando
a Saddam esperando una guerra que dure semanas y no años.
El Baath pretende resistir a la invasión atrincherándose
en Bagdad, Basra y otras ciudades. Uno de sus portavoces sostenía
que Irak es un país desértico y cuyas junglas son las selvas
de concreto. Es en los bosques urbanos donde los iraquíes piensan
que podrían neutralizar mejor la tremenda superioridad tecnológica
de los anglo- americanos.
En la segunda guerra mundial la lucha por Berlín o Stalingrado
costaron decenas de miles de muertos. Bagdad, con 5 millones de habitantes,
no sólo es más grande que dichas ciudades en los 1940s, sino
que es por lejos la urbe más poblada que confronta abiertamente a
una intervención anglo-americana.
Hussein se inspira en otros recientes movimientos islámicos.
En Mogadishu los norteamericanos fueron obligados a ir luego de haber
producido una matanza al tratar de entrar a un barrio controlado por las
fuerzas de Aidid. En Beirut y el Libano los israelíes tuvieron
que retirarse debido a la hostilidad de la población. Los saddamistas
sostienen que la 'intifada' palestina marca un ejemplo en el cual la población
con piedras se enfrenta a una fuerza ocupante.
Las fuerzas ocupantes están ante un dilema. Si lanzan una
ofensiva frontal e indiscriminada en Bagdad se corre el riesgo de producir
tantas bajas civiles que se enajenaría a gran parte de los más
de mil millones de mahometanos y se crearía tal resentimiento dentro
de los iraquíes que luego sería difícil contenerlos.
Lo importante para ellos no es sólo ganar la guerra sino la paz.
Para esto último requieren haber ganado el apoyo de amplios sectores
de la población local.
La estrategia que vienen siguiendo los británicos en Basora
es la de rodear ésta, tratar de confraternizar con la población
ocupada, ir haciendo algunas incursiones progresivas y buscar generar un
levantamiento interno anti-saddamista.
Hace 12 años los chiítas de Basora y el sur iraquí
se sublevaron cuando EEUU les instó a ello. Mas, se sienten traicionados
por que Bush padre permitió que Bagdad los aplastase pensando que
era mejor mantener la estabilidad iraquí con una dictadura desarmada
a la cabeza antes que permitir que revoluciones desintegren al país.
La tesis de sitiar las grandes urbes también presenta inconvenientes.
Prolonga la guerra generando mayor oposición interna. Según
Robin Cook, ex secretario de relaciones exteriores británico, es
uno de los métodos más crueles contra los civiles, quienes
deben padecer de falta de alimentos y servicios.
Hussein quisiera empujar a los anglo-americanos a bombardear de tal
manera a las urbes iraquíes que generaran más odio y cobijo
donde resistir. Saben que los anglo-americanos no quieren una política
de tierra arrasada pues anhelan retomar la valioso infraestructura económica
del país y quieren ganar a su gente. Confiados en ello, los saddamistas
quieren provocar a los aliados a una política de guerra total en
la cual el régimen aparecería identificado como héroe
de la causa iraquí, árabe y musulmana.
Para Saddam su ideal sería producir muchas bombas humanas que
paralicen al enemigo y que le obliguen a separarse de una población
civil en la cual desconfíen. Una guerra de ocupación dejaría
por los suelos la estrategia de aparecer como demócratas liberadores.
Incluso de llegar a ocupar las grandes urbes el costo sería muy
alto pues a cambio perderían la paz y generarían la libanización
de la cuna del panarabismo.
Scott Ritter, ex inspector de armas de la Organización de las
Naciones Unidas (ONU), veterano de la primera guerra del golfo y miembro
del gobernante Partido Republicano, concibe que la actual ofensiva está
logrando lo opuesto a lo inicialmente deseado. Un dictador tan impopular
aparece simbolizando una resistencia nacional y los EEUU se están
ganando la antipatía de un pueblo al que hubiesen querido ganar:
"Jamás podremos hablar de instalar un gobierno pro estadounidense
para el pueblo de Irak. Al final nos expulsarán. Abandonaremos Irak
derrotados, de la misma manera que los rusos dejaron Afganistán".
Es esto lo que quieren los antiimperialistas árabes. Aunque
al final pierdan las ciudades, quieren que ello se produzca con el mayor
costo humano posible a fin de hacer casi imposible una futura reconciliación
de los iraquíes o árabes con occidente, y luego resistir desde
las comarcas o con marchas con piedras en las ciudades.
Ciertamente, la mejor estrategia para haber echado a Hussein consistía
en haber promovido un levantamiento popular interno. Ello hubiese sido
hecho a costa de menos cotos humanos y materiales, y hubiese ayudado a que
los propios iraquíes se liberen a sí mismos y democraticen
más su sociedad.
Mas, las lecciones de 1991 es que para el Departamento de Estado dicha
alternativa es más peligrosa que mantener a Hussein. El resultado
es esta guerra en la cual los anglo-americanos tienen grandes posibilidades
de tomar las urbes desde el desierto, pero donde el problema mayor será
como estabilizar y pacificar a un país que a la larga puede tornarse
en una fuente de problemas mayores que Somalia o Líbano.
Para los atacantes quedan 3 posibilidades. Una es una guerra total
rápida y violenta que conquistaría Bagdad pero a costa de
mucha destrucción. La otra es cercar las grandes urbes y tratar
de crear contingentes iraquíes anti-saddamistas leales a occidente,
pero ello puede tomar tiempo y hay desconfianza en que los destacamentos
locales puedan tener su propia agenda. A los 60,000 combatientes kurdos
en el norte no les empuja en masa a marchar sobre Mosul por temor a Turquía
e Irán y también por no poder controlar luego a ellos. Con
respeto a las decenas de miles de combatientes del Consejo Supremo (Chiíta)
de la Revolución Iraquí, los aliados se niegan a empujarlos
contra Saddam pues temen que luego ellos e Irán creen otro contra-poder.
Una tercera alternativa es la esbozada por sectores del laborismo británico
quienes recomiendan un cese al fuego y una retirada para evitar que el
conflicto siga escalando.
Por el momento los atacantes buscarán alguna fórmula
basada en las 2 primeras opciones o en una combinación entre éstas.
Si la guerra se complica es posible que crezca el sector que propone el
armisticio. A este último apuntaría la estrategia iraquí
de agotar a los ocupantes con su guerra prolongada de la ciudad al campo.
* Isaac Bigio, analista Internacional
|
SE CREA NUEVA CENTRAL SINDICAL UNETE
Por: Miguel Angel Hernández Arvelo
Publicado: 06/04/03 |
|
||||||||||||||
|
Demasiados muertos en hospitales de Bagdad
como para contarlos
Por: AP
Publicado: 06/04/03 |
|
||||||||||||||